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U.S. military and civilian vessels are critically vulnerable to asymmetric 
threats in littoral environments. Common asymmetric weapons such as Anti-Ship 
Cruise Missiles (ASCM), Low Slow Flying (LSF) aircraft and Fast Attack Craft 
(FAC) / Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC) threaten U.S. strategic goals and can 
produce unacceptable losses of men and material.  
The SEA-18B team presents an operational concept for a family of 
Unmanned Surface Vessels (USV) capable of defending ships from asymmetric 
swarm attacks. This USV, the Tailorable Remote Unmanned Combat Craft 
(TRUCC), can operate in concert with the next generation of capital surface 
vessels to combat this critical threat with maximum efficiency. 
Critical performance criteria of the TRUCC family were determined 
through agent-based simulation of a Straits of Hormuz Design Reference 
Mission. Additional models addressed ship synthesis and operational availability. 
A Technology and Capability Roadmap outlines areas of interest for 
investment and development of the next-generation USV. Interim technology and 
capability milestones in the Roadmap facilitate incremental USV operational 
capabilities for missions such as logistics, decoy operations and Mine Warfare. 
The TRUCC operational concept fills a critical vulnerability gap. Its 
employment will reduce combat risk to our most valuable maritime assets: our 
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 U.S. military and civilian vessels are critically vulnerable to asymmetric 
threats in littoral environments.  Common asymmetric weapons such as Anti-Ship 
Cruise Missiles (ASCM), Low Slow Flying (LSF) Aircraft And Fast Attack Craft 
(FAC)/Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC) threaten U.S. strategic goals and can 
produce unacceptable losses of men and material.  These threats weigh heavily 
in the strategy calculus for the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) environment. 
 The SEA-18B team presents an operational concept and 
Technology/Capability Roadmap for a family of USVs capable of defending ships 
from air and surface asymmetric swarm attacks in the littoral domain.  By 
developing the Tailorable Remote Unmanned Combat Craft (TRUCC) in concert 
with the next generation of capital surface vessels, the TRUCC fleet is shown to 
be a highly effective force multiplier.  The potential employment of TRUCCs 
provides force protection in choke points, straits and high-threat areas worldwide, 
allowing manned capital ships to continue critical blue-water missions.  Open 
architecture and common interfaces permit various configurations of the 
TRUCCs as delineated by a variety of threat mixes regardless of Area of 
Operations (AOR), and accommodate future sensor, communications and 
weapons capabilities. 
 The critical performance criteria of the TRUCC family are determined 
through Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE).  Agent-based simulation 
analysis coupled with a Straits of Hormuz Design Reference Mission (DRM) 
reveal the most important criteria for TRUCCs in the force protection role.  These 
major design criteria were force ratio (number of TRUCCs relative to attackers), 
TRUCC weapon Probability of kill (Pk) and weapon firing rate.  This output 
highlighted the important factors for USV development.  Large numbers of lower-
cost vessels will have more combat capability than a smaller number of larger 
vessels.  Although this concept runs counter to the existing surface ship 
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development plan, it aligns with the New Navy Fighting Machine concept 
proposed in 2009.  Additionally, the need to have highly capable weapons on 
smaller ships points to the need for open architecture and common interfaces.  
This allows for increased weapon (and therefore TRUCC) capability as 
technology increases.  Highly capable weapons on a (relatively) low technology 
TRUCC platform offer the greatest combat capability against asymmetric threats. 
 Due to the number of units necessary to carry out missions, Operational 
Availability (Ao) and reliability are of critical concern for successful TRUCC 
development.  Manned surface combatants achieve Ao numbers of between 
20%-60%, and exhibit relatively low reliability.  The required size of the TRUCC 
fleet increases rapidly as Ao decreases, generating the need to focus 
development of high Ao requirements early in the acquisitions process.  Similarly, 
with no man in the loop to make mid-mission repairs, the TRUCC cannot use the 
existing surface ship reliability strategy.  The loss of assets due to mid-mission 
failures, with the associated security and tampering issues, is of critical concern.  
The report proposes use of reliability paradigms from aviation and space 
industries, because mid-mission system failures are mission critical for USVs. 
 A Technology and Capability Roadmap outlines areas of interest for 
investment and development of the next-generation USV using scenario 
development theory.  The key capability milestones necessary for TRUCC 
development are identified with their attendant technology and policy elements.  
Design best practices, scalability laws and rational investment theory 
substantiate interim technology and capability milestones from the Roadmap. 
Incremental USV operational capabilities in mission areas such as maritime 
logistics, decoy operations (such as the Advanced Offboard Decoy) and Mine 
Warfare will serve as stepping-stones to the kinetic and autonomous force 
protection capability of the TRUCC, but require funding and community interest. 
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The TRUCC operational concept fills a critical vulnerability gap and its 
employment will reduce combat risk to our most valuable maritime assets: our 
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A. PROJECT BACKGROUND 
The leadership of NPS’s Systems Engineering Analysis (SEA) curriculum 
generated the tasking statement for this project.  In some instances, the SEA 
team received suggestions for additional guidance from sponsors; at other times, 
there was sufficient student and advisor capacity to advance the tasking to be of 
emergent value for the Navy.  Numerous Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) 
programs are under development; however, no academically rigorous front-end 
systems engineering analysis has been conducted to guide a far-reaching, long-
term USV technology and capabilities study.  Having identified the need for a 
thorough, comprehensive study a few future integrated manned force structure 
with USV capabilities, the SEA curriculum distributed the following tasking 
statement to Systems Engineering Analysis Cohort 18, Team B: 
Design a family of USVs that can be integrated with manned and 
other unmanned forces to address a broad spectrum of missions.  
Assess how USVs can be integrated with manned and other 
unmanned forces to improve Navy (Joint) mission success. 
Consider a broad spectrum of missions that:  
 Accelerate mission completion (e.g., lethal, non-lethal interactions, 
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), logistics) 
 Change the dynamics and numbers for offense and defense (e.g., swarm 
or saturation attacks) 
 Extend existing capability (e.g., Intelligence Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (ISR)) 
 Reduce risks (e.g., deception) 
 
 Deny access (e.g., Mine Warfare)  
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1. Scope 
The scope of the study focused on USV capabilities and their applications 
to future military missions.  This provided an opportunity to generate a roadmap 
necessary to implement recommendations along with a validation plan. 
2. Project Team 
Given the sweeping scope of the project, assembling and organizing a 
Systems Engineering team was essential to project success.  Information 
management, modeling and simulation, statistical analysis, naval architecture 
and computer programming were some of the skills required to manage the 
scope of the project; groups were formed based on the skill sets of the 
individuals.  The core team consisted of six U.S. Naval Officers with over 35 
years of operational fleet experience assigned full-time to the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Systems Engineering Curriculum.  The analysis began 
September 2011. 
In January of 2012, 12 additional members from various specialties jointed 
the core group of six, creating a cross-campus integrated project team.  Table 1 
represents the varied backgrounds and experiences of these engineering 
students. 
A broad base of experience coupled with cultural diversity, combined with 
significant real-world experience across a broad spectrum of technical and 
tactical areas, contributed greatly to the team’s analytical process and overall 






Table 1.    SEA-18B Team Listing 
 
 
Last First Rank Title Curric Community / Specialty
Jacobi Loren LCDR Program Manager SEA Aviation / WTI / JTAC (10 Years)
Bush Adam LT Lead SE SEA Subs Nuclear Engineering (7 
Years)


































Ong Chin Chuan (Chase) MAJ Team Engineer MOVES Singapore Armed Forces ‐ 
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II. PROBLEM DEVELOPMENT 
The given tasking statement granted the team significant latitude to use 
the principles of Systems Engineering, particularly with regard to developing the 
problem statement.  Ultimately, the team chose a tailored, feedback-driven 
Waterfall Systems Engineering Process (SEP) model to guide the project 
progress, depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.   SEP Tailored Waterfall model 
With the systems engineering process selected, the team organized for 
independent mission research into the following Task Groups as seen in Figure 
3: (TG – 1) Vessel Escort, (TG – 2) Oil Platform Defense, (TG – 3) Harbor 
Defense, and (TG – 4) Mine Warfare.  Each group consisted of a mission subject 
matter expert supported by three technical experts.  Their findings were 
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unmanned systems fit into a future force structure is paramount.  Analysis 
recommending an operational concept for a USV incompatible with U.S. strategy 
would not satisfy the intent of the project tasking. 
Investigation of military mission areas at the core issues of need and 
problems is reflective of a “bottom-up” analysis.  A bottom-up analysis starts with 
the lowest level of perceived need, and progresses hierarchically to ensure that 
any solution retains congruity with the high-level requirements.  Without a 
thorough understanding of mission areas, it is impossible to execute an analysis 
that leads to an effective, deployable operational USV concept.  An analysis that 
produces an operational concept for a USV that is incompatible with the missions 
and tactics of our forces would have limited utility. 
There was a major initial assumption of the (top-down/bottom-up) 
approach.  SEA-18B assumed that most unmanned systems fielded to date were 
not the result of holistic Systems Engineering analysis.  Put another way, the 
U.S. military (and other militaries, for that matter) are fielding unmanned systems 
in response to urgent operational needs rather than as a part of a high-level 
acquisitions plan.1  The two-pronged review of unmanned system utilization 
represented the bulk of the problem definition effort.  The specifics of the problem 
definition are described in section (iii) of this report, Problem Development. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Before making a decision on specific problem within the problem space, 
SEA-18B conducted a thorough review of available literature in Table 2.  The 
mission subject matter experts read all high-level documents and passed the 
information along through their leadership role in their TR-groups.  Mission-area 
documentation was divided amongst Task Group Leads, who reported to the 
SEA-18B team on their assigned areas.  
                                            
1 (Gansler, 2009, p. 8) 
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Table 2.   Reviewed Literature by SEA-18B Group 
 
 
The top-down documentation in Table 2 led the team to some central 
strategic and operational themes, as well some important constraints for future 
military missions.  The bottom-up documentation in Table 2 helped identify a 
method for functionally scoping future military missions.  The four main problem 
domains identified were: (1) defend a known, (2) find an unknown, (3) logistics, 
and (4) offensive operations/power projection.  Based on further stakeholder 
discussions and SEA-18B technical expertise, the domain selected for detailed 
investigation was defend the known. 
C. STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION AND ELICITATION 
Given the broad scope of the Information Gathering/Problem Definition 
stage, the stakeholders involved in this study spanned a broad spectrum of 
military and civilian specialties.  The major stakeholders at Naval Postgraduate 
School (in Table 3) guided the project studies as well as provided critical 
feedback throughout the project cycle.  This core group provided near-daily 





















Table 3.   Major Stakeholders 
Last  First  Rank  Specialties 
Chung  Timothy  CIV/Ph.D  Robotics Systems Engineering 
Ellis  Winford (Jerry)  RADM (Ret)  Undersea Warfare 
Langford  Gary  CIV  Systems Engineering 
Williams  Rick  RADM (Ret)  Surface Warfare 
In keeping with the broad scope chosen for the Problem Development 
stage, the project team cast a wide net to capture stakeholder inputs.  The focus 
of discussion was the current and future needs of unmanned systems as well as 
current and perceived future issues in USV development.  The natural 
concentration for an Unmanned Surface Vessel study is easily centered on the 
U.S. Navy Surface Warfare community and Naval technology developmental 
agencies, such as the Office of Naval Research (ONR).  While these 
communities provided invaluable feedback to the team, there was a conscious 
decision to reach beyond the Surface Warfare specialty and the Navy in general.  
Similarly, identifying stakeholders was not limited only to those involved in 
unmanned systems.  Understanding a wide range of missions, technologies and 
methodologies paid significant dividends when forming the problem definition.  
Specifically, the stakeholder discussions highlighted areas within the problem 
space on which the SEA18B team could have some influence, such as high 
value unit protection.  The stakeholder discussions also identified the areas of 
the problem space that the team could not influence, like the general acquisition 
process.  
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Table 4.   Key Stakeholders 
 
Many stakeholders contributed in minor ways to the project; however, 
Table 4 lists those who provided substantive input into the Systems Engineering 
Process.  Each of these individuals contributed their time to the elicitation 
process.  Many stakeholders participated in multiple interview sessions, including 
Video Teleconferences (VTC) and Temporary Active Duty (TAD) trips.  In all, the 
Tailorable Remote Unmanned Combat Craft (TRUCC) project team conducted 
over 100 stakeholder interviews during this process.  For example, the 
discussions with John Dudinsky from Naval Surface Warfare Command Panama 
City highlighted the importance of interoperability between unmanned systems.  
Last First Rank Title
Amster Ken CIV Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake
Barber Arthur (Trip) CIV SES Deputy Director Assessment Division (N81)
Canning John CIV G82 Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren
Castelin Steve CIV Senior Systems Engineer, Unmanned Systems Tech NSWC Panama City
Cramer Megan Ph.D PEO LCS S&T Lead
Crute Daniel CIV Head, Modeling and Simulation and Unmanned Systems Technology Div
Crystal Sargent LT NPS Student
Derek Brown CIV Global Vigilance Combined Test Force
Douglas Barry CIV Director Fleet Support & Rapid Prototyping
Dudinsky John CIV Naval Surface Warfare Center ‐ Panama City Division
Elijah Soto CIV Deputy Director Unmanned Systems
Foster Dave CiV Senior Systems Engineer
Garcia Greg CIV Ph.D Naval Surface Warfare Center ‐ Panama City Division
Heermann Philip CIV Ph.D Senior Manager for intel Systems, Robotics & Cybernetics, Sandia Nat. Labs
Horner Douglas CAPT/ Ret Naval Post Graduate School Unmanned Systems Lab
Hughes Wayne CAPT (RET) NPS Senior Lecturer
Ivy Robert (Bob) CIV Maritime Systems at General Dynamics Robotic Systems
Joeseph Douglas CIV Net‐Centric Warfare Analysis
Kimmel Rich CIV MIW Requirements N8 for NMAWC
Kragelund Sean CIV Naval Post Graduate School Unmanned Systems Lab
Kucik Daniel CIV Ph.D Naval Surface Warfare Center ‐ Panama City Division
Marchefsky Christopher CIV ONR Science Advisor to OPNAV N81
Matos Tony LCDR PEO Ships (SEA 21)
Nussbaum Matthew MAJ ACC 9 OG/OGV
Sanzero Sandy CIV Ph.D Manager for intel Systems, Robotics & Cybernetics, Sandia Nat. Labs
Shafter Dustin CIV Network Analyst
Smith Thomas CAPT Commanding Officer, Naval EOD Technology Division
Steadley Scott CAPT Military Deputy (Code 7005) Ocean & Atmospheric S&T NRL
Stewart Andrew CIV Ph.D Ocean Engineer for APL UW
Stirbl Robert (Bob) CIV Ph.D Program Manager, Navy, Marines, and other DoD agencies JPL
Tree Andrew CIV Head, Weapons Environments & Simulation Branch
Turner Jim (JT) CDR NECC Assistant COS Strategy and Technology
Ward Robert (Bob) CIV (Phd) OPNAV N81 Scientific Analyst
Warren Nick CAPT / USMC White House Military Office
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In addition to the stakeholders listed, the team engaged various stakeholders 
by attending community conferences of interest.  These included the: 
 Surface Navy Symposium 10–12 JAN 2012 
 Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International Program Review 
7–9 FEB 2012 
 ONR Unmanned Maritime Systems Conference 30–JAN–2012 through 2–
FEB–2012  
Attendance at these conferences increased the team’s understanding of current 
and future needs impacting unmanned systems.  Taking advantage of the 
opportunity to interact with the various communities resulted in an increased 
understanding of the tasking statement.  Common themes from the conferences 
were the need for cooperative inter-community development, and increased 
standardization of manned / unmanned system interfaces. 
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III. NEEDS ANALYSIS 
Unmanned Surface Vehicles can provide combat capability and increase 
efficiency (in terms of Operations and Support (O&S) costs) only when the 
correct system is paired with the correct mission.  A thorough Systems 
Engineering Analysis of this problem required connecting and coupling high-level 
strategy with low-level tactical employment as well as analyzing the 
appropriateness of the technical requirements for unmanned systems to support 
and augment manned systems.  The appropriateness of this understanding, 
when applied to the initial tasking statement, led to the underlying problem 
statement for this project.  In summary, the problem is as follows: current USV 
analysis provides only short-term guidance; manned vessel procurement hangs 
on long-term, front-end, analysis of capabilities and threats.  To define a 
manned-unmanned mix for the future, a similar long-term analysis is required for 
unmanned systems.  
A. WHY UNMANNED SYSTEMS? 
Unmanned systems are expensive to develop and can involve high levels 
of technical risk when implemented in a short time frame.2  They can also result 
in high O&S costs due to system complexity and/or system immaturity.  
Heretofore, urgent operational needs have driven the development of unmanned 
systems.3  The effects of the high demand were particularly evident in the 
dramatic and rapid increase of unmanned air systems (UAS) executing ISR 
missions in the Global War on Terror.  Similarly, counter-Improvised Explosive 
Device (IED) operators employed dozens of different Unmanned Ground 
Vehicles (UGVs) as they grappled with the IED problem in Iraq.   
                                            
2 (Winnefield & Kendall, 2010, p. 42) 
3 (Gansler, 2009, p. 8) 
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Beyond urgent operational needs, there is a need for unmanned systems 
in the long-term force structure of the armed forces.  The coupling of increased 
operational risk with decreasing budgets places a high priority on achieving 
efficient combat capability, minimizing the threats to personnel, and vital 
equipment.  As budgets decrease, a mix of manned and unmanned systems will 
confront threat countries who are “rapidly acquiring technologies, such as 
missiles and autonomous and remotely-piloted platforms that challenge our 
ability to project power from the global commons and increase our operational 
risk.”4  Providing sufficient analysis to allow decision makers to define the 
optimum mix of manned and unmanned systems is at the very heart of this study.  
B. MISSION CATEGORIZATION PROCESS 
The first step in identifying missions for which USVs add value in terms of 
lower cost and risk involved identifying the full range of missions executed by the 
Department of Defense (DOD).  Given the broad scope of the project tasking, the 
project team did not initially limit investigation to maritime missions.  Using the 
knowledge gained during the Information Gathering phase (spanning Air force, 
Army, Navy, and Marine Corps, as well as contractors, researchers, and test 
range operators), in addition to organic operational experience, the project team 
identified the major missions of the U.S. military and their associated sub-
missions.  While simple in theory, community and service definitions of mission 
areas complicated this process.  For example, the term “air defense” has many 
different meanings to different services.  Effectively categorizing missions 
required a significant level of taxonomy development, associative matching, and 
correlative comparisons; a small portion is shown in Figure 5.  
                                            
4 (Obama, 2010, p. 12) 
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Figure 5.   Mission Categorization Attempt 
Ultimately, the Systems Engineering Process, guided by stakeholder 
feedback and documents, such as the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) and Joint 
Mission Essential Task List (J-METL), led to development of 17 overall mission 
areas, supported by 74 associated sub-missions (see Appendix I).  After 
missions were identified, the project team analyzed each mission area to match 
the tasking statement scope with specific missions.  Basic questions were posed 
to further this effort.  These questions included: 
 Would an unmanned system prevent a human from being harmed? 
 Would an unmanned system perform the task better than a human? 
 Does the unmanned system perform a task that a human can not? 
These questions attempted to codify the benefits of an unmanned system in each 
mission.  The answers to these questions resulted in a set of rules by which the 
differences between manned and unmanned systems could be assessed. 
Unfortunately, basic rule sets alone were too simplistic to guide a decision on 
manned vs. unmanned systems.   
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Figure 6.   Intersection of Trade Space 
The normal trade space for the acquisition of any system is cost, schedule 
and performance.5  The project team assumed that sufficient time was available 
to accommodate the technology integration required for unmanned system 
employment, so the schedule variable was not considered in the analysis trade 
space.  Unmanned system capability exists within the trade space of risk, cost, 
and mission effectiveness, shown in Figure 6.  Risk, in this context, is defined as 
risk of loss of life or injury.  One of the main advantages of unmanned systems is 
the ability keep personnel out of harm’s way.  Mission performance is the ability 
of the system to complete a mission based on the measures of effectiveness.  
Cost spans the full life cycle cost of the system.  It is important to note that this 
analysis does not conduct a full life cycle cost analysis for the TRUCC.  That cost 
estimation is open for further study.  The cost analysis in this report was limited 
to rough order of magnitude procurement cost.  As unmanned systems become a 
potential tool toward mission accomplishment, this trade space dominates the 
essential decision criteria facing the DOD.  An in-depth understanding of these 
                                            
5 (Rendon & Snider, 2008, p. 5) 
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compromises becomes particularly important in a resource-limited environment.  
Purchasing unmanned systems because they can perform a mission does not 
guarantee combat efficiency.  Simply put, just because a USV is capable of 
conducting a particular mission, it does not mean it necessarily should.  If the 
unmanned system cannot achieve sufficient mission effectiveness, does not 
result in decreased risk, or system cost increases, then the manned system is 
the better choice.  This essential trade space should be at the forefront when 
discussing unmanned systems integration.  In the words of Keith Bontrager, 
“Strong. Light. Cheap. Pick any two.”6  Unmanned systems are not the panacea 
for all the DOD’s budgeting, risk mitigation, and combat effectiveness problems; 
however, an effective manned / unmanned mix can provide an efficient, highly 
effective force. This report provides quantitative analysis to assist in decisions 
regarding what missions USVs should do, and the areas of USV design that drive 
mission success.  The systems engineering process is particularly well suited to 
further this effort as it balances the needs of the stakeholders with the 
boundaries set by the system. 
                                            
6 (BONTRAGER, 2011, p. 1) 
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IV. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Current unmanned systems analysis is insufficient to propel the 
development and integration of unmanned systems into future force structure 
decisions.  Studies to date have generally been limited in scope to five years or 
less.  This method of analysis contrasts sharply with the 30-year shipbuilding 
plan that offers a holistic approach to shipbuilding building based on strategic 
priorities and budget realities.7  Interestingly the 30-year shipbuilding plan 
considers only manned vessels, although unmanned systems are relatively 
inexpensive, relatively easy to build, and have shorter lifecycles than capital 
ships.  Given the dramatic impact of unmanned systems, particularly UASs, in 
the Global War on Terror, it is reasonable to assume that unmanned systems will 
influence the manned force structure during the next 30 years.   
There are significant hurdles associated with identifying the right mission 
areas of which to apply unmanned systems to gain maximum combat efficiency.  
Technology development and policy guidance for unmanned systems are 
potential barriers to integrating these force multipliers into the long-term force 
structure.  The project team used needs analysis to identify a capability gaps 
suited to USVs.  Gaps are defined as deficiencies in operational or use concepts, 
current or projected operational or utility disadvantages, technologies, or 
misunderstood future needs.8  Many potential gaps were identified; however, the 
most stressing was Multi-Threat Force Protection.  
Each gap in Figure 7 is associated with a Design Reference Mission 
(DRM).  A Design Reference Mission defines a specific projected threat and 
operating environment baseline for a given force element, which range from a 
single-purpose weapons system, to a multi-mission platform, or system of 
                                            
7 (Director, Warfare Integration (OPNAV N8F), 2011, p. 21) 
8 (Langford, Foundations of Value Based Gap Analysis: Commercial and Military 
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(not yet named) is scheduled to begin construction in 2031 and to combat threats 
through 2060 and beyond.10  Given the long lead-time of these ships, 
requirements analysis based on long-term analysis of future threats is incumbent 
in manned ship construction.  Applying the same long-term, high-level analytical 
process will prevent costly overruns and duplicity.  Long-lead planning is a best 
practice.11  The Air Force’s Global Hawk was intended to duplicate some 
capabilities of the manned U-2.  Instead of returning better mission effectiveness 
the unmanned system proved less capable and more costly.12  Programmatic 
failures are bound to happen; no analysis can prevent all technological or cost 
failures in the acquisitions process; however, a thorough, long-term analysis that 
examines a true manned / unmanned surface ship mix will minimize the cost and 
capability implications of these failures.  Inadequate USV analysis limits progress 
towards achieving unmanned capability and will force the Navy to continue its 
tradition of a manned surface fleet into the foreseeable future. 
B. FUNCTIONAL MISSION BREAKDOWN  
Attempting to predict the future of warfare was beyond the scope of this 
project; however, an analytical method of examining future missions was 
required to anchor this report in a bounded, future realism.  Developing an 
analysis for the 17 missions and 74 sub-missions (see Appendix I) identified 
during early stages of the project would have been cumbersome at best.  
Therefore, the project team applied the Systems Engineering approach to 
categorize mission sets in terms of capabilities.  By taking a functional approach, 
four broad categories of missions emerged. 
C. FUNCTIONAL MISSION DEFINITIONS 
Listed are the functional mission category definitions. 
                                            
10 (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (N8), 2012, p. 16). 
11 (Sullivan & Pickup, 2006, p. 1) 
12 (Schogol, 2012, p. 1) 
 22
1. Defend a Known (The Process) 
Operations conducted to prevent unwanted influence on designated 
friendly or neutral assets.  Generally, this functional area encompasses missions 
such as force protection, escort missions and anti-surface warfare.  These 
operations can protect moving or stationary assets against the full range of 
enemy influence, from kinetic strikes to electromagnetic interference and 
monitoring.  
2. Find an Unknown (The Process) 
Operations conducted to locate, identify and characterize an object of 
interest. This functional area encompasses missions such as Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance and mine sweeping. The purpose of these 
missions can vary across the spectrum of military influence.  An object, once 
localized, may be acted on (kinetically or otherwise) immediately, at some future 
point, or simply tracked for situational awareness. 
3. Logistics (The Process)  
Operations conducted to move personnel, equipment or materiel to or 
from an area of interest. This functional area encompasses missions such as 
amphibious ship-to-shore movement, overland convoy operations and trans-
oceanic transportation. The purpose of these missions is ultimately to connect 
logistics and operational nodes. 
4. Offensive Operations / Power Projection (The Process) 
Operations conducted to actively influence an object of importance. This 
functional area encompasses missions such as long-range strike, naval surface 
fire support and close air support. The purpose of these missions is to actively 
strike enemy assets at the time and place of the attacker’s choosing. 
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The last mission is assumed to be primarily in the realm of ground forces, 
or those supporting ground operations.  With the concurrence of project advisors, 
the research was scoped to the first three functional mission categories.  
D. FUNCTIONAL MISSION COMPARISON 
For validation, the four functional mission categories were compared to 
the functions presented in the 2009 study completed at NPS titled The New Navy 
Fighting Machine.13 This document examined a hypothetical future force 
structure comprised of a larger number of less-capable, specialized vessels than 
utilized today.  To that end, the authors of The New Navy Fighting Machine 
conducted a similar functional grouping of missions. These functions were: 
 Safeguard the movement of goods and services at sea 
 Deny enemy movement 
 Deliver goods and services from the sea 
 Prevent enemy delivery to our shores 
These functional categories were slightly different from those mentioned 
previously; however, they encompass similar concepts.  The functional mission 
area “Safeguard the movement of goods and services at sea” has a strong 
correlation to “Protect the Knowns.”  Additionally, “Delivery of goods and services 
from the sea” correlates to “Logistics.”  The last functional category “Prevent 
Enemy Delivery to our shores” correlates to “Offensive Operations/Power 
Projection”; however, the point of view is different.  The SEA-18B function 
assumes that the U.S. military will be executing offensive operations; the New 
Navy Fighting Machine authors assumed that prevention of offensive operations 
by others is the ultimate goal.  Another key difference was that the New Navy 
Fighting Machine assumes there are no unmanned surface vehicles in the fleet.  
The related missions are summarized in Figure 8. 
                                            
13 (Hughes Jr, 2009, p. 24) 
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Figure 8.   Mission Relations 
E. FUNTIONAL MISSION UTILITY 
Classifying missions by broad function allowed the maximum utility and 
flexibility for the analysis of future missions.  In broad terms, the missions of the 
military were categorized using these definitions.  Future missions will have 
different tactics, better sensors, and harder-to-find targets, but the four main 
functional categories remain. 
It was not the goal of the project team to assign import to any specific 
threat system or weapon, but rather to examine the sensitivities of functional 
missions to military capabilities.  The analysis process allowed the comparison of 
different USV configurations.  For example, the comparison of vessels with high 
speeds to those with slower speeds to determine which best accomplished the 
functional mission of “Defending the Knowns.”  Divorcing the missions from 
specific mission equipment allowed just such a capability-based assessment.  
For example, the missile firing rate in a particular scenario was not defined by a 
specific weapons system, such as the Rolling Airframe Missile. 
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Designing a system-of-systems to exploit the capabilities highlighted in 
this study remains for future detail design; however, the importance of these 
capabilities cannot be overstated.  Identifying the capabilities that influence a 
functional mission area gives analytical weight to the types of long-term force 
structure decisions that will drive efficiency in the acquisitions process. 
F. DESIGN REFERENCE MISSIONS 
The project team developed four discrete Design Reference Missions to 
relate these functional categories to missions.  The creation of specific DRMs 
was an essential step in revealing the key design factors of unmanned surface 
vehicles.  The specific environmental factors described in each DRM allowed the 
project team to develop the assumptions required for modeling and simulation.  
 
 DRM 1: Logistics 
 DRM 2: Decoy Operations 
 DRM 3: Mine Sweeping 
 DRM 4: Multi-Threat Force Protection 
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V. DESIGN REFERENCE MISSIONS 
The Design Reference Missions were scoped to littoral missions, 
commonly referred to as “brown-water” and “green-water” missions. “Blue-water” 
operations were not investigated.  These missions have traditionally been the 
domain of manned U.S. Navy Capital ships; only in recent years have littoral 
missions resurfaced, particularly with the foundation of riverine squadrons and 
the Naval Expeditionary Combatant Command.  While no commonly-accepted, 
cross-community definitions of brown water and green water exist, they are 
conceptually distinct from blue water missions.  By common convention, blue-
water missions imply long-duration, open-ocean deployments.  Brown-and-green 
water missions imply missions close to shore. 
USVs are uniquely appropriate for littoral operations for many reasons. 
First, the littoral Concept of Operations (CONOPS) are still developing, making it 
easier to integrate new technologies.  The cost of building and trying something 
in an environment marked by change is less than with existing technology. 
Secondly, the extensive manpower infrastructure geared to support blue-water 
missions is slow to change.  Using unmanned systems in the littoral 
environments can minimize the changes required to support the increased 
presence in these areas.  Additionally the Surface Warfare community is well 
vested in multi-role manned capital ship construction.  Absent major disruptive 
changes to the 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan, the large multi-role capital ship will 
continue to dominate blue-water missions.  Lastly, even highly reliable USVs will 
experience failures that require manned repair processes.  Manned ships on long 
blue-water deployments can conduct mid-cruise repairs using existing ships’ 
crews.  Unmanned ships experiencing similar failures on long deployments may 
require intervention that is much more extensive.  Getting repair or recovery 
teams to distant failed USVs represents a much greater challenge for blue-water 
operations than to those in the littorals.  Highly reliable platforms mitigate the risk 
of mid-mission failures on long deployments; however, this could be cost-
 28
prohibitive particularly given that the technology for USVs has yet to be 
operationally fielded.  For these reasons, the DRMs chosen for this analysis were 
restricted to littoral operations.  
The analytical process used herein could apply to blue water operations; 
however, some underlying assumptions would likely change, thereby influencing 
the analytical results.  For example, sensor range could conceivably become a 
driving sensitivity factor in a blue-water modeling environment. 
A. LOGISTICS DRM 
Generally speaking, logistics missions are efficiently executed by manned 
vessels.  Large ocean-going civilian maritime vessels typically have crews of 
between 20 and 40 personnel.  Even the military’s Landing Craft Utility has a 
crew of only 10.  Despite this efficiency, there are many reasons why an USV 
might be used for the transportation of goods and personnel.  High-threat 
environments, such as resupplying embattled Marines in a remote location, or 
high-risk environments, such as those involving Chemical Biological Radiological 
(CBR) threats, are natural areas for USV employment for logistics missions.  
Additionally, a TRUCC configured for logistics could serve as a springboard for 
technology development benefiting other mission areas.  
In order to achieve this goal, the USV must be able to execute waypoint 
navigation and deal with obstructions and conditions along the way.  Above-
water obstructions such as other vessels, landmass and floating surface clutter 
represent only part of the navigation problem for an USV.  Submerged objects, 
sand bars and shoals are additional obstacles that a USV may be required to 
deal with reliably.  Ultimately, these tasks need to be executed reliably enough to 
comply with international maritime law, specifically the International Regulations 
for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS).  Lastly, sufficient reliable two-way 
communication structures must exist to support USV tracking, mid-mission re-
direction and fault monitoring. 
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Several communities can benefit from technology necessary to support 
the logistics Design Reference Mission.  The United States Marine Corps 
(USMC) and amphibious Navy could execute efficient ship-to-shore movements 
with a logistics USV.  The Surface Warfare community and the Military Sealift 
Command could use these for their respective logistics missions. 
It is important to note that all of the technologies necessary to support the 
logistics DRM currently exist, but they are not fully integrated into a cohesive 
system.  The maritime environment requires situational awareness both on and 
below the water.  Demonstrating the reliability of such a navigation system and 
certifying its use for the global maritime environment would contribute 
significantly to the time required for initial operational capability.  
B. DECOY TRANSPORTATION DRM 
The second DRM was transportation of decoy systems, such as the 
Advanced Offboard Decoy.  The technology required for this DRM is consistent 
with the Logistics DRM; however, it is distinct because it represents a non-kinetic 
option for the “Protect the Knowns” mission category.  Generically, decoy 
systems attract enemy weapon systems.  Using unmanned systems in this DRM 
reduces risk to manned vessels; the weapons would target the unmanned ships 
and/or their decoys rather than manned vessels.  The TRUCC could deploy with 
a decoy and execute waypoint navigation in a manner representative of High 
Value Unit (HVU) patrol, such as an aircraft carrier deployment.  Alternatively, the 
decoy-carrying TRUCC could maintain station on a HVU, but maintain a 100 
nautical mile separation, causing an enemy to believe the deployed force was 
larger than actual.  
The same requirements exist for this DRM as for logistics, with the 
potential capability to maintain station on a command unit, such as a HVU.  The 
requisite technology already exists, and its integration into this DRM has 
relatively low technological risk. 
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The Surface Warfare Community, USMC, and the amphibious Navy are 
the primary communities of interest for this DRM. 
This capability should be developed in concert with the Logistics DRM as 
they share essentially the same technology. 
C. MINE WARFARE DRM 
To support Mine Warfare in this DRM, the USV would not execute Mine 
Warfare itself, but rather transport, deploy, and recover Mine Warfare equipment.  
Most of today’s Mine Warfare system-of-systems use a similar concept; the Mine 
Warfare equipment operates independent of the host vehicle moving it through 
the water.  For example, the prime mover could be a helicopter or a surface ship.  
The function of the mission equipment is completely independent of the towing 
platform for functions other than movement.  Some examples of sonar equipment 
operating independently are the AQS-20 Mine Hunting Sonar and the ALQ-220 
Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep (OASIS) and Single-Pass Detect-
to-Engage.  The Single-Pass Detect-to-Engage system, notably, is in its 
conceptual infancy, but could be engineered to work within this DRM. 
To conduct this mission, the USV would require the capabilities from the 
previous DRMs.  The USV would transport Mine Warfare equipment around the 
battlespace as directed by the Mine Warfare commander, and as dictated by the 
ranges and deployment envelopes of the Mine Warfare systems.  The USV 
would have to interact with mission equipment not present in the previous DRMs.  
The interaction with mission equipment requires open architecture and common 
interfaces to maximize system utility.  Open architecture and common interfaces 
are at the heart of a multi-role Mine Warfare USV, because the USV would not 
be limited to a single Mine Warfare system.  In one configuration, the USV could 
be used for mine sweeping, then reconfigured for mine hunting, using mission 
equipment from two different contractors.  If open architecture and common 
interfaces are mandated in the requirements stage of both the USV and the Mine 
Warfare systems, this DRM could become a reality. 
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The primary communities of interest are the Mine Warfare community and 
the Surface Navy. 
Because of the difficulties involved in specifying, standardizing, and 
developing open architecture and common interfaces, the Mine Warfare 
capability would take significantly longer to develop than the Logistics and Decoy 
capabilities. 
D. MULTI-THREAT FORCE PROTECTION DRM 
In this DRM, the USV protects friendly ships from high-density swarm 
threats as they operate in high threat littoral areas by detecting, classifying, and 
engaging threat systems. 
The USV requires all the capabilities discussed thus far: waypoint 
navigation, obstruction avoidance, COLREGs compliance, two-way 
communications, maintaining position on a HVU, open architecture, and common 
interfaces.  Additionally, the USV must have a high level of cognitive capability.  
Theater Rules of Engagement (ROE) cannot be cover all contingencies; they are 
heuristics that apply to a tactical scenario.  In today’s tactical situations, a human 
combines understanding of the ROE with situational awareness and makes life-
or-death decisions.  In order to achieve the Multi-Threat Force Protection DRM, 
the USV needs a level of cognition similar to that of a human decision maker in 
order to make tactical risk assessments leading to weapons release for situations 
not explicitly defined in the ROE.  
The USV will conceivably operate in various modes of independence.  At 
the highest level of independence, a USV will operate completely autonomously, 
with no human intervention.  In conservative modes, a human operator will 
control a network of USVs.  An efficient interface between man and machine is 
necessary to ensure DRM success, because swarms of threats can easily 
overwhelm a human controlling large numbers of USVs.  The consequence is 
time delays associated with increased human-processing rendering the USVs 
unable to conduct their force protection mission. 
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The primary community of interest for the Multi-Threat Force Protection 
DRM is the Surface Warfare Community; however, the technology described for 
this DRM has the potential to influence the UAS and Unmanned Underwater 
Vehicle (UUV) communities.   
The high-level cognitive capability development timeline represents the 
longest lead-time development cycle, because of the associated programming 
complexity, processing speeds, and policy issues. 
E. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT 
This family of USVs is capable of operating across a wide range of 
mission areas using configurable weapons, sensors and communications 
equipment.  Depending on the level of technical maturity, mission type, and 
control required, the TRUCC could operate via remote control (i.e. one operator 
to one USV), operate fully independently (full autonomy) or using a combination 
of these two extremes.  For example, the USV may transit independently to an 
area of interest, then alert an operator when the terminal area is reached.  
Alternatively, a swarm of TRUCCs could work collectively to defend a high value 
unit from attack.  A single person (or small group of people) could control a 
swarm operating collectively.  Depending on the ROE, the TRUCCs could alert 
the operator that a target had been identified for engagement; the operator would 
then consent to weapons release.  These two examples of operating 
independently and collectively show different ways in which the TRUCC could 
incorporate various levels of autonomy (“sliding autonomy”) to reduce the 
reliance on manned control stations.  Given time, research, and operational 
employment-inspired development, sliding autonomy would increase and move 
closer to independent and autonomous capabilities.  Commensurately, the 
operational concept would evolve to include the processes supportive of 
autonomous, semi-autonomous, and tethered operations. 
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F. TRUCC SHIP SYNTHESIS 
The Mission Vehicle team conducted ship synthesis on three types of 
TRUCC hull forms to execute the DRMs.  Ship synthesis provides early stage 
vessel development, rooted in naval architecture principles.  The vessels within 
each group have a range of sizes to facilitate integrated modeling analysis with 
the other modeling groups.  The Mission Vehicle team selected three ranges of 
vessel sizes by analyzing possible deployment methods.  The vessels were not 
limited to the proposed deployment methods and served as a starting point for 
this analysis.  Ship synthesis provided three points (small, medium, large) in a 
solution space to conduct analysis. 
1. Small 
The Small TRUCC length ranges from 7 to 36 feet.  This size vessel has 
the capability to be directly deployed via a boat davit.  This deployment method 
leverages existing infrastructure and deployment techniques currently in place on 
today’s surface combatants; most Navy ships would have the capability to launch 
and recover a Small TRUCC using existing shipboard equipment.  The Small 
TRUCC ranges in size from a small Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) to that of a  




Figure 9.   USV Model-Small (7–36 feet) 
2. Medium 
The Medium TRUCC length ranges from 37–90 feet.  This size of vessel 
could be transported in the welldeck of a modern amphibious ship, such as a 
Dock Landing Ship (LSD).  Two vessels of this size could be stored fore-and-aft 
within the welldeck, leveraging existing amphibious ship transportation 
capabilities.  This TRUCC size equates to the approximate size and 




Figure 10.   USV Model- Medium (36–90 feet) 
3. Large 
The Large TRUCC ranges in length from 91–200 feet.  A vessel of this 
size would most likely transit independently to an Area of Responsibility (AOR), 
or be delivered via maritime prepositioning assets.  A TRUCC this size allows the 
use of long-range weapons.  This vessel is approximately the same size and 





Figure 11.   USV Model-Large (91–200 feet) 
The three design points (small, medium, large) where ship synthesis was 
used covers the main deployment methods used today.   
G. TRUCC EMPLOYMENT CONCEPT – FORCE PROTECTION DRM 
Given the scope of the project, including the schedule and manpower 
limits, the Force Protection DRM was selected for further development.  The 
Force Protection DRM represents the most efficient use of project team 
resources and encompasses technology and capabilities required for the other 
DRMs.  Focusing on the most complex DRM allowed analysis of many of the 
aspects of the other DRMs.  There are, of course, opportunities to further 
develop aspects of the other DRMs, such as the on-load/off-load issues for the 
Logistics DRM.  Issues specific to the other DRMs remain for further exploration 
by follow-on efforts. 
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In the Force Protection DRM, the TRUCCs deploy as a team to protect a 
HVU.  This DRM allows the TRUCCs to leverage local and over-the-horizon 
networking capability to cooperatively engage incoming threats as shown in the 












Figure 12.   TRUCC Conceptual Employment OV-1 
The weapons and sensors for individual TRUCCs are configurable by a 
land-based, forward-deployed support detachment.  The operational TRUCC 
support staff determines weapon and sensor configuration based on intelligence 
analysis of enemy tactics and disposition in much the same way that loadouts 
are specified for strike aircraft in today’s carrier airwing.  The potential exists to 
field a TRUCC team with heterogeneous loadouts to account for different threats 
(for example, Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) and FAC/FIAC within a single 
mission).  
Due to limited size of the TRUCC, the mission duration is limited to brown- 
and green-water operations.  Refueling at land-based maintenance depots 
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affords opportunities for frequent maintenance operations resulting in increased 
mid-mission reliability.  This operational employment concept represents a 
realistic and achievable method of integrating USVs into the future Navy’s force 
structure and deployment methods in the littoral environment. 
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VI. TRUCC FORCE PROTECTION MODELING 
A modeling effort was necessary to provide quantitative weight behind the 
major vessel characteristics that contribute significantly to mission success.  The 
quantitative analysis evaluated the relative benefits of various areas in the vessel 
design trade space. Based on the operational employment concept, a single 
TRUCC vessel type will be able to confront a variety of threats.  Modeling was 
necessary to determine what design factors were the most important.  For 
example, as shown in Table 6, the most important design factors are weapon 
firing rate, number of TRUCCs and weapon Probability of kill (Pk).  The 
numerous trade-offs associated with TRUCC vessel characteristics were 
examined through Model-Based Systems Engineering to verify the importance of 
the design factors.   
For the modeling phase, the project team re-organized into three distinct 
modeling groups: Mission Effectiveness (ME), Mission Vehicle (MV) and 
Operational Availability (Ao). The division of labor allowed more efficient use of 
project team resources.  
The Mission Effectiveness group was responsible for agent-based 
simulation of the tactical scenario.  The Mission Effectiveness group used a 
program developed by the New Zealand military called Map Aware Non-Uniform 
Automata (MANA).14  MANA provided the ability to model inter-squad intelligence 
reflective of groups of networked TRUCCs operating as a cohesive team to 
defeat an unpredictable incoming threat.  The Mission Effectiveness group 
focused on ranges of vessel speeds, sensor ranges and weapon characteristics, 
rather than modeling simple point values.  This modeling process allowed 
development of sensitivities that lead to identification of key performance 
characteristics. 
                                            
14 (McIntosh, Galligan, Anderson, & Lauren, 2007) 
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The Mission Vehicle group was responsible for conducting basic ship 
synthesis for vessels with the characteristics employed by the Mission 
Effectiveness group.  The group applied regression techniques, parametric 
analysis, system research and stakeholder feedback to develop three general 
types of USV hulls.  The ship synthesis also identified the associated weapons 
and sensors capabilities that these hulls could reasonably employ.  
The Operational Availability group modeled the total number of TRUCCs 
required in theater based on operational availability and reliability data derived 
from the DRM.  The purpose of this analysis was to determine the anticipated 
fleet requirements for the employment of this USV.  
Each modeling group produced a detailed discussion on the technical 
aspects of their modeling efforts, which is included for further review in the 
Technical Compendium section of this report.  The overarching concepts and 
limited results of each group are discussed in the next section. 
A. MODELING GROUP INTERACTIONS 
To derive a holistic picture of the TRUCC operational modeling, the 
modeling groups were highly interactive.  The Mission Effectiveness group chose 
to model the TRUCCs using a wide-range of generic capabilities (e.g., speed, 
weight, weapon ranges, and firing rates).  These generic capabilities were not 
tied to specific weapon systems, sensors, or platform types; however, current 
systems were used to form analogues for modeling.  For each variable, an upper 
and lower bound were selected, and explored through a half-factorial design of 
experiments. For example, the modeled firing rate of a medium caliber weapon 
was a range that included the actual firing rate of a 25MM gun.  
To ground the modeling assumptions in reality, the Mission Vehicle group 
translated the generic capabilities into the physical domain (e.g. converting 
vessel speed and weapon firing rate into hull size and weapon type).  The ME 
group modeled a 30-knot vessel that carried a long-range sensor and 20 long-
range missiles.  The MV group translated the required mission equipment 
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capability into payload, and conducted ship synthesis to generate a conceptual 
vessel capable of meeting the requirement.  As previously discussed, the MV 
group anchored the ship synthesis to three distinct ranges of vessel sizes to 
scope the ship synthesis effort. 
The Operational Availability took the vessel characteristics, extrapolated 
endurance and reliability factors, and matched them to the DRM requirements.  
The extrapolation generated the total required force structure to accomplish the 
given DRM, accounting for combat operations, maintenance downtime and mid-


























Figure 13.   Modeling Group Interactions 
It is important to note that this modeling triad was run in several different 
ways.  Modeling teams, starting with an end-state Measure of Performance 
(MOP), generated the total required force structure in theater.  Alternatively, the 
modeling teams started with a given number of TRUCCs and assessed the total 
combat capability of a TRUCC fleet, given a certain size and type of vessel.  
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While this front-end analysis functioned primarily to determine the total required 
force structure to support a single DRM, the modeling method and programming 
generated by this study could be easily adapted to assess combat capability in 
many different regimes.  Additionally, only the Force Protection DRM was 
modeled by the ME group.  Developing modeling for other DRMs would allow a 
similar analytical process and output, while leveraging modeling work already 
completed by this project team. 
B. MISSION EFFECTIVENESS GROUP 
The ME group determined the physical characteristics of the TRUCC that 
had the greatest impact on mission success and the effectiveness of TRUCC 
designs proposed by the MV group. 
To execute this tasking, the group investigated several different modeling 
programs.  Most modeling programs do not allow for effective modeling of the 
proposed cooperative engagement tactics and intelligence of a group of 
TRUCCs.  An extensive search led to MANA.  MANA is an agent-based model; 
meaning that the entities inside the model are controlled by individual decision-
making algorithms.  Once the simulation starts, the user takes no part in 
controlling the agents’ actions.15  Each agent develops its own situational 
awareness and evaluates appropriate actions using assigned sensors, weapons, 
and communication links.  This program had the additional benefit of allowing 
users to watch a two-dimensional “battle” unfold between the threat systems and 
defending TRUCCs.  Viewing these combat interactions in real time allowed for 
trouble-shooting of parameters and analysis of results that would not be possible 
with “black box” modeling software.  
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It is important to note that developing advanced tactics for convoy escort was 
beyond the scope of this report.  A simple screening formation was chosen as a 
representative defensive tactic; however, further tactics development may reveal 
alternative formations or changes to the defensive radius that provide increased 
effectiveness.  
1. Attacker Capabilities 
The attackers for this DRM fall into three categories, and execute two 
different types of behaviors. The threat types are: 
a. Fast Attack Craft / Fast Inshore Attack Craft 
These are representative of small, fast and maneuverable boats 
commonly employed by threat nations in littoral waters.  They can employ simple, 
short-range weapons, or act sacrificially, as in the bombing of the USS Cole 
(DDG 67). 
b. Low Slow Fliers 
Low slow flying air vehicle threats involve small planes, helicopters 
and unmanned aerial systems of all types.  These systems are difficult to detect, 
carry heavy payloads and may employ tactics and maneuvers not achievable by 
missile systems. 
c. Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles  
Fast-moving missiles designed specifically for ship engagements 
pose a particularly difficult engagement problem for any defensive system. 
D. ATTACKER BEHAVIOR 
The LSF and the FAC/FIAC attackers can exhibit two distinct types of 
behavior: smart or dumb.  Dumb attackers do not try to avoid the TRUCCs, even 
when detected.  This behavior simulates attackers that drive towards the HVU 
regardless of defender tactics or capabilities.  Smart attackers attempt to avoid 
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the TRUCCs while still trying to reach the HVU.  These different tactics represent 
two possible attacking system behaviors.  There is a wide variety of tactics and 
geographic and temporal distributions available to swarm attackers.  These two 
behaviors constrained the problem to a workable variable space; the time 
constraints of the project prevented the use of a greater number of threat 
systems combinations. 
The characteristics of threat systems were derived from the performance 
of high-technology fielded systems of today.  The underlying assumption was 
that the difficult-to-produce, high-technology fielded systems of today will be 
highly proliferated in the future.  These threat systems will likely be used for 
swarm attacks over the 40–50 year time span of this study.  This study made no 
attempt to conduct analysis on disruptive weapons technologies of the future.  
Those disruptive technologies will undoubtedly influence the battlespace; 
however, they are less likely to proliferate in the time scope of this project.  
Anticipating and planning defensive systems for possible future disruptive 
weapons technologies is beyond the scope of this study.  The characteristics of 
each threat system are available in Table 5. 
For the purposes of modeling, the threat swarms were assumed to be 
homogenous.  Theoretically, threat swarms could be heterogeneous, utilizing 
combinations of threat systems to complicate the threat scenario.  Initial 
modeling with homogenous threats revealed sensitivities against each type of 
threat, eventually allowing operational decisions regarding TRUCC weapon 
loadouts against heterogeneous threats. 
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Table 5.   Threat Performance Characteristics 
 
Red Enemy  ASCM  LSF  FAC/FIAC 
Number of Red  60  60  60 
Speed of Red (m/s)  1012  111  20.58 
Sensor Detection Range
(m)  15000  15000  15000 
Sensor Detect Probability  1  1  1 
Weapon Range (m)  200  200  200 
Weapon PK  1  1  1 
Weapon Firing Rate (sec)  1  1  1 
 
E. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND PERFORMANCE 
Based on the DRM, a causal diagram in Figure 15 shows the factors that 






































Figure 15.   Mission Effectiveness Factors 
The red and blue factors listed in the diagram are the independent 
characteristics of the TRUCC and the attackers in the DRM.  All of these factors 
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combine to determine the values of the secondary factors in green.  These 
factors combined with additional independent factors to determine the tertiary 
factors (shown in black) where the Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) for the 
system are determined. 
The MOE for the DRM in question was the probability of survival of the 
HVU.  The primary supporting MOPs were the number of attackers killed by the 
HVU and TRUCCs, respectively.  The threat system’s effective Probability of kil 
was 1; if it evaded the HVU or TRUCC defenses, the HVU would suffer a mission 
kill.  Each HVU had its own defensive capabilities, ranging from robust layered 
defensive systems (such as DDGs) to no defensive equipment (such as Military 
Sealift Command vessels). 
The wide range of defensive capabilities made it impractical to derive 
DRM MOE directly.  Therefore, the number of attackers killed by the TRUCC 
fleet was the modeling analysis tool for this DRM.  By assuming a defenseless 
HVU, the analysis focused on TRUCC parameters, and avoided 
interdependencies caused by interactions with HVU targeting systems.  
Operational-level tactical considerations of cooperative engagement between 
manned and unmanned systems exist for further development.  As such, the 
primary analysis metric for Mission Effectiveness was the MOP “number of 
attackers killed by TRUCCs.” 
1. Modeling Analysis 
The ME group conducted a half-factorial design, selecting 64 scenarios 
coupled with 10 additional center-point scenarios, for a total of 74 modeling runs. 
Each scenario was repeated eleven times for a total of 814 runs.  This design 
identified primary factors of importance, as well as second-order interactions. 
The factor summary is shown in Table 6. Factor 1 is the most significant; Factor 
5 is the least. Each factor is color-coded for ease of identification of like factors.  
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Table 6.   Mission Effectiveness Dominant Factors 
 Table 6 shows that the dominant factors are: 
 Number of TRUCCs (force ratio) 
 Weapon Probability of kill 
 Weapon firing rate 
With the primary sensitivities generated, a stepwise regression process 
was used to form a model that predicted the number of threat systems killed, 
given TRUCC capabilities.  The Mission Vehicle group provided the 
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Smart LSF threats; however, there was a major difference between the number 
of Medium TRUCCs and Small TRUCCs needed to counter the Dumb LSF 
threat.   
In this scenario, the medium-caliber weapon of the Medium TRUCC was 
able to engage enough incoming Dumb LSFs that they did not overwhelm point 
defenses.  Interestingly, Small TRUCCs were overwhelmed by the Dumb LSF 
threat.  The near-simultaneous arrival of Dumb LSFs, coupled with the Small 
TRUCC’s short range, small-caliber weapons combined to generate a more 
stressing scenario than the Smart LSF threat.  Smart LSFs circled around the 
Small TRUCC defensive formation, and attacked the HVU in small groups, or as 
singles, when opportunities presented themselves. 
F. TIME DELAY MODELING 
Additional modeling was conducted to explore the effects of time delay in 
the identification of the attacker.  This modeling effort was designed to simulate a 
man-in-the-loop scenario by generating a situation in which an attacker was 
detected, but positive hostile identification was delayed, potentially due to the 
need for interaction with a manned control station prior to weapons release 
authorization.  In previous modeling, TRUCCs could engage attackers upon 
initial detection because classification occurred at the same time as detection 
(assuming the unmanned system had the authority to classify an inbound track 
as hostile and engage with lethal force).  This assumption represented the least 
stressing case, because there was no time delay associated with the need for 
human decision or communication latency.  To gain a better understanding of the 
effects of that assumption, the team developed a new scenario to examine 
delays in the detect-to-engage sequence of up to ten seconds. 
1. Time Delay: ASCM Impact 
For ASCM engagements, because the relative rate of closure was 
extremely fast, sensor range became increasingly important as the classification 
delay increased.  Absent a delay, the TRUCCs were able to react immediately to 
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the hostile threat; therefore, more defensive weapons were applied towards the 
threat, improving the overall probability of survival.  As classification delay 
increased, fewer defensive engagements were possible and the probability of 
survival decreased significantly.  As anticipated, there was a significant tradeoff 
between sensor range and the human or machine agent’s ability to classify a 
threat which can only be mitigated through the employment of long-range 
sensors and/or faster classification and engagement.   
2. Time Delay: LSF Impact 
For both Smart and Dumb LSF engagements, time delays up to ten 
seconds had no effect on the factors of importance.  Since LSFs were much 
slower than the missile threat, sensor range was not a significant factor.  With 
longer-delay durations (not evaluated here based on the front-end assumption 
that ten seconds was the maximum relevant delay) sensor range became 
important, as seen in the ASCM instance.   
3. Time Delay: FAC/FIAC Impact 
For Dumb FAC/FIAC scenarios, as delay increased, sensor range became 
more important because the number of TRUCCs became less important.  The 
FAC/FIAC was the slowest moving of the threats.  Against slow-moving threats, 
TRUCCs had sufficient time to maximize the use of their defending forces, even 
if equipped only with short-range weapons.  As the time delay increased, the 
importance of early warning from a long-range sensor increased. 
In the smart FAC/FIAC scenario, as with the dumb FAC/FIAC scenario, 
sensor range became more important with increasing time delays.  In this 
instance, though, weapon range remained the most important factor as the delay 
increased.  This was due to the maneuvers performed by the smart FAC/FIACs 
attempting to find a gap in the defenders. 
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4. Scalability 
Modeling was conducted to examine the effects of scalability upon system 
performance.  Holding the force ratio between the TRUCCs and the attackers 
constant, the total number of attackers was multiplied by two, three, and five.  
The red attack force was fully destroyed in every scenario regardless of the 
multiplier used.  From these results it is safe to conclude that the TRUCC system 
performance is close to linear (red force attrition proportional to blue force level) if 
the force ratio is held constant.   
G. MISSION VEHICLE GROUP 
The Mission Vehicle group used an engineering perspective to calculate 
objective attributes for a given set of design variable values.  The goal of the 
model was to use fixed mission parameters such as speed, total displacement, 
and type of hull to return capabilities and figures useful to other groups for further 
analysis.  Detailed naval architecture is beyond the scope of this Systems 
Engineering study, and remains for follow-on study.  The efforts of the MV group 
are, however, rooted in naval architecture principles through the use of ship 
synthesis methods.  Ship synthesis is a technique to allow early stage vessel 
development with the limited data available.18  Ship synthesis calculations are 
rooted in naval architecture principles without requiring detailed ship 
specifications. 
During initial scoping, the MV group limited hull types to monohull designs 
due to the vast number of ships in existence using this hull form, its low 
technological risk, suitability in the littoral environment, and necessity for potential 
low-speed operations derived from early screening experiments.  Additionally, 
only maritime diesel propulsion was examined; it is a mature and reliable 
technology currently employed in vessels conducting the operations proposed in 
the operational concept.  This assumption was corroborated by the reliability 
                                            
18 (Choi, 2009, p. 12) 
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dependencies on mission effectiveness by the Operational Availability group 
detailed later in the report.  Based on these initial assumptions, the TRUCC 
vessels fall into three distinct size categories; small, medium, and large.  The 
general characteristics are summarized below and discussed further in the 
Mission Vehicle Technical Compendium. 
1. Small TRUCCs 
i. Length to Beam Ratio (L/B) is approximately equal to 3:1 
ii. Beam to Draft (B/T) ratio is approximately equal to 2:1 
iii. Length ranges from 6 to 36 feet 
iv. Small-caliber weapons 
2. Medium TRUCCs 
i. L/B is approximately equal to 4.1:1 
ii. B/T is approximately equal to 3.1:1 
iii. Length ranges from 37 to 90 feet 
iv. Small-caliber weapons 
v. Medium-caliber weapon 
3. Large TRUCCs 
i. L/B is approximately equal to 5.25:1 
ii. B/T is approximately equal to 3.125:1 
iii. Length ranges from 90 to 200 feet 
iv. Small-caliber weapons  
v. Medium-caliber weapon 
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 Medium caliber weapons: Medium mass projectiles, medium 
Pssk, high rate of fire 
 Missiles: Guided, fused projectiles, high Pssk, medium rate 
of fire 
1. Small Caliber  
Examining multiple manned combat vessels revealed a relationship 
between vessel length and the number of small caliber weapons.  For every 12.7 
feet of length, there can only be one small caliber weapon.  The representative 
weapons system for small caliber munitions was the GAU-19 machine gun. 
2. Medium Caliber  
Using the manned systems scheme, a single medium caliber weapon was 
placed on all medium class ships and above.  A representative weapon system 
for this class of weapon is the 25mm MK38 Mod 2 machine gun. 
3. Missiles  
A directional launch missile system was placed on Large TRUCC variants.  
A Vertical Launch System (VLS) was not considered due to space and weight 
constraints on vessels of this size.  The weights of the systems included 
launcher, fire control (guidance) and missile magazine.  Representative weapon 
systems for this class of weapon are the RIM-162 Sea Sparrow and the RIM-116. 
I. VESSEL CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE 
By examining the characteristics of existing combat vessels, the MV team 
created a series of regressions to generate TRUCC characteristics and 
performance data estimates.  For example, a series of existing combat vessels 
ranging in length from 7’ to approximately 200’ were examined.  Using standard 
naval architecture characteristics, such as block coefficient (Cb) and L/B, the MV 
group started with ship displacement and worked backward to produce 
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systems decisions are made regarding TRUCC design, and as such, these 
illustrative values should not be considered final design specifications.  This ship 
synthesis process produced vessel performance and characteristic data sufficient 
for further use by the Operational Availability and Mission Effectiveness groups.  
L. OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY GROUP 
Any discussion of USVs is incomplete without a discussion of Operational 
Availability (Ao).  The operational concept provides opportunities for TRUCCs to 
receive maintenance at a forward operating base.  Though forward-deployed 
maintenance facility is certainly a force-multiplier, it is critical to model the 
maintenance downtime implications on the TRUCC fleet operational capability.  
Furthermore, even well-maintained TRUCCs will suffer mid-mission failures at 
some point.  Both of these immutable facts of military operations generate the 
need for more TRUCCs beyond the minimum number required for threat 
mitigation. 
The operational availability modeling was conducted using ExtendSim® 
8.0 stochastic modeling software.  The software provided an easy-to-use 
interface allowing the group to connect simple functional blocks to mimic complex 
real-life processes.  A representative model is shown in Figure 21.  The complete 



































































































to identify relevant information and conclusions.20  The DOE created by JMP® 
was a randomized experiment using three factors, each with nine levels, resulting 
in a 9x9x9 full factorial design randomized screening experiment, totaling 729 
total runs, to determine which, if any, of the factors were significant.  The other 
input variables (reliability, number of hours for the model, number of TRUCCs 
that can be on mission, the number of TRUCCs that can be repaired or 
maintained at the same time, and the number of hours before routine 
maintenance) were held constant within the model.  The screening experiment 
used an assumed 0.8 start-up operational availability factor, 5,000 hours for the 
run time, 30 TRUCCs required on mission, five TRUCCs repaired at a time, and 
1,500 hours for routine maintenance.21 Table 12 covers the stochastic variables 
and associated distributions utilized for this analysis. 
Table 12.   Statistical Distribution Table 
Statistical Distribution Table 
Factor  Distribution Type  Mean  Standard Deviation 
Endurance  Normal  Varied between TRUCC Variants  30 minutes 
Refueling  Normal  45 minutes  6 minutes 
Maintenance  Poisson  Varied between TRUCC Variants  ‐‐ 
N. MODELING INPUTS 
The number of vessels in the “TRUCC Pool” accounted for maintenance 
downtime; at any given time, it assumed that only 80% of TRUCCs would be 
operationally available for sortie.  Put another way, 80% of TRUCCs exhibit 
“start-up availability”; they would be ready to commence a mission at any given 
random time.  Startup availability was a deterministic point value derived from  
 
 
                                            
20 (SAS Institute Inc, 2012) 
21 (Caterpillar Corporation, 2011, p. 2) 
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extrapolation of currently fielded maritime combat systems and from operational 
experience.22  Accounting for the maintenance downtime helped determine the 
total number of TRUCCs required for mission success. 
Poisson distributions were not used because true independence cannot 
be assumed in a managed maintenance pool since vessels are often 
cannibalized for parts to maximize operational availability of the group and 
maintenance procedures are planned around scheduled operations.  These 
procedures are similar to accepted aviation squadron maintenance procedures.  
Currently fielded combat systems exhibit operational availability as shown in 
Table 13.   













Given the proposed concept of operations, the assigned start-up 
availability of 0.8 was a reasonable assumption based on the values of currently 
fielded systems represented in Table 13 and Table 36.  TRUCCs are smaller and 
less complex than the given systems.  Furthermore, the littoral environments will 
limit long patrols, creating more opportunity for preventative maintenance to  
 
 
                                            
22 (Congressional Budget Office, 2007, p. 20) 
23 (Congressional Budget Office, 2007, p. 20) 
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ensure high levels of availability.  It is important to stress that this value was a 
starting value for analysis.  Explicit availability values should be based on further 
specification of the scenario and system parameters. 
Maintenance requirements were modeled using analogous maintenance 
requirements for diesel propulsion systems.  Diesels are currently fielded on 
manned vessels within the size ranges specified by the Mission Vehicle group.  
Furthermore, these propulsion systems exhibit relatively high levels of reliability, 
i.e., they are mature technologies.  Other technologies may be worth 
investigating; however, Table 6 shows that the speed of the TRUCCs was not a 
major factor in to achieve the measure of performance; there is no need for 
cutting-edge propulsion technology.  As such, analysis was limited to maritime 
diesels. 
The mid-mission reliability of individual TRUCCs was assumed to be 95%.  
Achieving this high level of reliability is critical to unmanned system performance.  
Without a man-in-the-loop for mid-mission repairs, potential failures pose a 
significant vulnerability and liability for the operation.  USVs that fail mid-mission 
are susceptible to exploitation by enemy actors, pose hazards to navigation, may 
injure innocents, and/or may require extensive employment of assets for vessel 
recovery operations.  For these reasons, it was reasonable to look for reliability 
paradigms from other communities where mid-mission reliability is mission 
critical, such as the aviation community.  For example, the Extended Range 
Multi-Purpose (ER/MP) UAS regularly achieves an overall system operational 
availability greater than 0.9.24  Using the aforementioned example, the TRUCC 
system was assumed to achieve a reliability of no less than 0.95 to deploy, 
complete the mission, and return to base. 
Throughout the analysis, maintenance times were scaled based on 
TRUCC size category.  Small TRUCCs were assumed to require maintenance 
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VII. DOCUMENTING COST 
Given that this is an early stage study, cost estimation was given some 
consideration; however, a complete cost estimation effort is left to follow-on 
study.  Without a clear study of the manpower and cost necessary to develop 
autonomy, a complete cost estimation is not possible.  Manpower to support 
unmanned systems is a study unto itself, and beyond the scope of this project, 
but represents an excellent area for further research. 
It was possible, however, to generate initial order cost estimates for the 
USV major components.  Procurement cost data for this project was derived 
using the analogy approach.  Researching the total Other Procurement Navy 
(OPN) costs of the following platforms yielded a cost per linear foot for each 
platform.  All figures were converted to FY12 dollars and are depicted in Table 
15. 
 DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Class Guided Missile Destroyer 
 CG-47 Ticonderoga Class Guided Missile Cruiser (CG) 
 Cyclone Class Coastal Patrol Class (PC) 
 Mark V Special Operation Craft (MK V) 


























DDG  1836     1836    509  3.61     1  2 
CG  3163.3     3163.3   567  5.58     1  1 
PC  25.7     25.7    179  0.14     25  39 
MK V  4.6     4.6    82  0.06     64  100 
RHIB  0.85     0.85    33  0.03     140  217 
Large TRUCC  25.7  2.2  27.9    179  0.16     23  36 
Medium 
TRUCC  4.6  0.5  5.1    82  0.06     58  90 
Small TRUCC  0.9     0.9    34  0.03     136  211 
 
A. ASSUMPTIONS 
The baseline cost of a Large TRUCC was assumed to be comparable to a 
new PC construction.  In this instance, the PC’s habitability systems are replaced 
with the autonomy systems required for unmanned operation.  As depicted in 
Table 15, the cost of associated Large TRUCC weapon systems (if applicable) 
were in addition to baseline procurement costs and reflected in total costs. 
The baseline cost of a Medium TRUCC was comparable to that of a new 
MK V.  As depicted in Table 15 the cost of associated TRUCC weapon systems 
(if applicable) were in addition to baseline procurement costs and reflected in 
total costs. 
The baseline cost of a Small TRUCC is comparable to that of an 11-meter 
RHIB.  Small-caliber weapon costs were negligible and not included in overall 
cost of procurement 
Using this data and the number of TRUCCs required for each threat 
scenario, a cost plot was developed as shown in Figure 26. 
 73
 
Figure 26.   TRUCC Fleet Costs vs. Threat Scenario 
This shows that the most efficient platform, from a pure procurement cost 
perspective, depends on the mission at hand, as well as the DRM.  Small 
TRUCCs appear cost efficient; however, this ignores some of the limitations of 
these vessels.  For the given Straits of Hormuz DRM, the Small TRUCC is 
capable of executing the mission only with multiple mid-mission refuelings.  If the 
given DRM had shorter ranges, then the Small TRUCC would be the clear cost 
winner.  The Medium TRUCC exhibits the lowest cost, given the endurance 
constraints of the Straits of Hormuz DRM.  As explored by the Mission Vehicle 
group, placing missiles on the Medium TRUCC could further spread this cost 
efficiency across the ASCM and Smart LSF missions, further increasing the cost 
efficiency of the Medium TRUCC. 
B. COST ESTIMATION IN DEPTH 
Cost estimation was conducted including the total required force structure 
Operational Availability, as well as the probability of mid-mission failures.  In this 



















the minimum required number of TRUCCs to disable the enemy.  By combining 
the Binomial curves and Ao numbers generated by the Operational Availability 
group, the minimum number of TRUCCs required to achieve a 95% probability of 
mission completion is shown in Table 16. 
Table 16.   TRUCCs Required for 95% Mission Completion 
TRUCCs Required for 95% Probability of Mission Completion
Threat Small Medium Large
ASCM 36 16 4
Smart LSF 15 14 4
Dumb LSF 17 9 4
Smart FAC/FIAC 7 4 4
Dumb FAC/FIAC 7 4 4  
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VIII. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
A. OVERVIEW 
An Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is defined as an analytical comparison of 
the operational effectiveness, cost, and risks of proposed materiel solutions to 
gaps and shortfalls in operational capability.  AoAs document the rationale for 
identifying and recommending a preferred solution or solutions to the identified 
shortfall(s).25 
B. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES  
The team investigated and considered many different possible alternatives 
when conducting this analysis.  In the end only one was chosen for further 
analysis.  The initial alternatives considered were: 
 Air assets  
 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) 
 Manned small boats 
 Guided Missile Destroyers and Guided Missile Cruisers 
1. Air Assets Alone to Protect the HVU for the DRM  
The term air assets includes all manned aircraft, all unmanned aircraft, 
and a mixture of both manned and unmanned aircraft.  This was not a practical 
alternative because: 
 It requires a dedicated aircraft carrier in the region or a squadron stationed 
close by 
 An aircraft carrier requires capital ship escorts on station for the duration 
of the mission 
                                            
25 (MITRE Corporation, 2011, p. 1) 
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 There is a limited number of aircraft carriers 
 Alternatively, this approach would require development and fielding of a 
UAV aircraft carrier 
2. Deploying an Entire Squadron to the region 
The use of a squadron of combat aircraft is possible and could be 
sustained throughout the DRM, but was not a practical alternative because: 
 There are difficulties with access to air space in and around the Straits of 
Hormuz 
 Combat aircraft are highly effective against FAC/FIAC and LSF threats, 
but provide limited defense against ASCMs 
3. LCS to Protect the HVU  
This approach might provide adequate protection against the FAC/FIAC 
threat, but it was not practical because: 
 It provides little protection against the LSF and ASCM threats  
 It is a single-mission focused platform (Anti-submarine Warfare, Mine 
Warfare, and Surface Warfare) and is not designed to operate in high-
intensity air threat environments26  
4. Manned Small Boats to Protect the HVU  
These might provide adequate protection against the FAC/FIAC, but was 
not practical because: 
 They provide little protection against the LSF and ASCM threats   
 This approach requires surface to air missile capability for LSF and ASCM 
threats.  This was ruled out due to the high risk to personnel onboard from 
                                            
26 (Baggett, 2008, p. 40) 
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noxious fumes and burns due to missile exhaust.  For this reason, the use 
of manned small boats was not considered for further analysis. 
5. DDGs and CGs to Protect the HVU 
These warships are curently being employed in this manner and have 
sufficient capability against the FAC/FIAC, LSF, and ASCM threats.  For these 
reasons, the use of DDGs and CGs was selected for further analysis.  This 
analysis and how it compared to that of the TRUCCs is detailed in the following 
paragraphs. 
C. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES “BACK OF THE ENVELOPE” 
OVERVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT 
The project team developed a “Back of the Envelope” (BOE) model using 
Microsoft Excel® to compare and contrast alternatives to the TRUCC.  The 
model was designed to determine the number of manned assets required to 
successfully kill all threats to a HVU.  
The BOE was comprised of two portions: (1) Threat range to target position 
and (2) Number of assets required in order to ensure HVU survival.  The first 
portion used assumptions about threat and asset weapons as inputs.  They 
included: 
 Range of the threat 
 Velocity of threat 
 Range at which the threat is detected 
 Maximum intercept range for the asset weapon 
 Minimum intercept range for the asset weapon 
 Velocity of asset weapon 
 Time between asset weapon launches 
 Process time prior to the launch of the first asset weapon 
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The model then calculated five output parameters: 
 Time to threat impact 
 Time at which the threat would be detected 
 Earliest asset weapon launch time 
 Latest asset weapon launch time 
 Maximum number of asset weapon launches 
The purpose of the second portion was to determine the number of 
unmanned assets required for HVU survival.  The following were inputs to the 
second portion of the model: 
 Number of inbound threats 
 Probability of intercept of the asset weapon  
 Probability of kill of the HVU and asset given it was hit 
 Assumed radar cross section (RCS) relationship of the HVU and assets 
 Number of HVUs and assets 
 Total number of asset weapons available 
 Probability that the threat intercepts an asset or HVU given targeted 
The model then calculated five outputs: 
 Number of inbound threats 
 Number of threats successfully intercepted by the asset weapons 
 Number of leakers that got past the asset weapons 
 Number of leakers targeting the HVU 
 Number of HVUs destroyed 
500 independent runs were simulated and the results compiled.  The number 
of assets was incrementally adjusted to achieve 100% HVU survivability.   
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D. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES ASSUMPTIONS AND RESULTS 
Guided Missile Destroyers and Guided Missile Cruisers were used as 
alternatives to the TRUCCs with the following weapons: 
 Vertically launched standard missiles for the ASCM and LSF threats  
 Five .50-caliber machine guns (50 Cal) and one “Bushmaster” cannon (25 
mm) for the FAC/FIAC threat 
These warships are the primary vessels currently providing escort and 
point defense for HVUs and are expected to be in service according to the 30 
Year Shipbuilding Plan.27  Assumptions were necessary within the model to 
accurately compare the TRUCCs to the manned vessels and were representative 
of those made for the TRUCCs within the initial DRM.  
1. Anti-Ship Cruise Missile and Low Slow Flier Threats 
In accordance with the previous mission effectiveness modeling effort, the 
following parameters were used for the ASCM and LSF threat. 
 Initial range to threat: 80,000 yards from HVU 
 Cruise altitude:  50 ft. above Mean Sea Level (MSL) 
 Cruise speed:  Mach 3 for ASCM; 111 m/s for LSF 
Parameters for the DDG, CG, SM-2 and VLS parameters were obtained 
from unclassified open-source databases.28  The radar cross sections (RCS) of 
the HVU, DDG, and CG were determined by using a ratio between the average 
lengths, widths, and displacements of the vessels, using the DDG as the 
baseline as seen in Table 17 and Table 18.   
                                            
27 (Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (N8), 2012, p. 24) 
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Table 19.   HVU Survivability Statistics 
     ASCM Threat                 LSF Threat 








26 100% 4 100% 
25 99% 3 89% 
24 97% 2 0% 
23 92%   
22 80%   
2. FAC/FIAC Threat 
In accordance with the previous mission effectiveness modeling effort, the 
following parameters were used for the FAC/FIAC threat. 
 Initial range to threat: 40,000 yards from HVU 
 Cruise speed: 40 kts 
 Maximum detection range of 24,000 yds ( approximately the visual line of 
sight) 
 25 mm maximum intercept of 2,700 yds and a minimum intercept range of 
200 yds with a muzzle velocity of 3,609 ft/sec. and 200 rpm rate of fire30  
 .50-cal maximum intercept range of 2,000 yds and a minimum intercept 
range of 200 yds with a muzzle velocity of 3,050 ft/sec. and a 550 rpm rate 
of fire 
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Table 20.   FAC/FIAC Threat HVU Survivability 
FAC/FIAC Threat 










This BOE was compared with the original model for the mission 
effectiveness design effort.  The models for the TRUCCs and their respective 
alternatives yielded approximately the same results.  This was achieved by 
reducing the threat detection delay associated with a manned platform and 
increasing the firing rate of the SM-2 matching all of the threat and weapon 
parameters used by the mission effectiveness modeling effort.  The number of 
DDGs/CGs required to counter the ASCM threat was nearly identical to the 
number of TRUCCs required when the DDGs/CGs were configured with 
characteristics similar to the TRUCCs required by the mission effectiveness 
models. 
The BOE was, by nature, a conservative estimate; it assumed the 
TRUCCs were co-located at a point location in the center of the target area.  The 
MANA model produced more efficient results (i.e., fewer TRUCCs required) 
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IX. ROADMAP 
At the highest level, the roadmap is broken into three main operational 
concepts for control of USVs.  
 Manual remote control of a single USV by a single human (one-to-
one)   
 Control of multiple USVs by one human operator (one-to-many) 
 Completely autonomous operation of a group of USVs with no 
human interaction (full independence) 
The operational concepts are sequential, meaning that the technologies 
required to execute the second concept require all of the technologies required 
for the first concept and so on.  Any of the given DRMs can be executed utilizing 
any of these three types of control.  For example, Multi-Threat Force Protection 
could be executed by a group of operators each controlling a single TRUCC.  
The coordination of the TRUCC defensive tactics would be akin to pilots in a 
section of aircraft coordinating an attack.  Using one-to-many control, the TRUCC 
would execute many of the mundane functions (such as navigation) and only 
require user interaction to coordinate operations or provide by-exception direction 
as the attack unfolds.  Using fully autonomy, the TRUCC fleet would act as a fully 
networked system-of-systems to provide for the defense of the HVU without 
human interaction. 
The current state of existing capabilities places USVs at the early stages 
of the second operational concept.  One-to-many control has been 
demonstrated, but the systems are in very early stages of development.  The 
technologies required to achieve one-to-many control have yet to be fully 
developed.  The technologies required to achieve the third operational concept 
are not available at this time, but it is likely that they will be available within the 
time scope of this report. 
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1. Manual Control of Single Unmanned Surface Vehicle (one-to-
one)  
With this technology, the user is able to remotely control a single 
Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV).  The ability to conduct remote non-mission-
critical logistics transfer in a low-threat environment is an example of employing 
this capability in the future. As mission complexity increases, one-to-one control 
becomes more cumbersome and time delays increase (see Technical 
Compendium for full discussion). The technology required to support one-to-one 
control are shown in Figure 34. 
 
Figure 34.   Manual Control of Multiple Unmanned Surface Vehicles 
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2 Control of Multiple Unmanned Surface Vehicles By-
Consent/By-Exception (one-to-many) 
With this technology, the user is able to remotely communicate with 
multiple USVs as they encounter unknown situations requiring direction from a 
human.  The two forms of control in this operational concept are command by 
consent or exception.  In command by consent, the USVs ask for controller 
permission before starting an action.  In command by exception, the USV will 
conduct all actions unless the operator removes permission.  An example of 
employing this capability in the future would be the ability to conduct mine 
clearance operations within a hostile environment.  Mine clearance is a dull and 
dangerous task well suited for unmanned systems.  In this example the network 
of USVs would be tasked with locating mines within a pre-established area.  The 
USVs would continue to search the area without human direction until a mine is 
discovered, at which time the human would provide further direction to the 
network of USVs for neutralization of the mine. The technologies required for this 





Figure 35.   Control of Multiple Unmanned Surface Vehicles By-Consent/By-Exception 
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3. Autonomous Operation, No Human In/On Loop 
With this technology, the TRUCCs are able to operate without human 
intervention.  The TRUCCs are able to communicate to each other and other 
actors in the environment through wireless communications.  Full autonomous 
operation offers significant combat capability by reducing latency, as detailed 
fully in the Technical Compendium. This is particularly important for complex 
combat environments, such as Multi-Threat Force Protection. It is possible to 
execute Multi-Threat Force Protection with one-to-one and one-to-many control; 
however, as combat complexity increases, human operators become 
overwhelmed resulting in unacceptable system latency.  Reduced latency relates 
directly to increased combat capability of the TRUCC system-of-systems. The 
technologies required to achieve this capability is shown in Figure 36. 
 
 
Figure 36.   Autonomous Operation, No Human In/On Loop 
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4. Recommendations 
Based on analysis of current technologies and capabilities there are 
several recommendations. 
DOD should continue to invest and develop detailed rule sets for 
capabilities 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6.  The logic and low-level autonomy 
represented by these capabilities is still very immature.  Improvements in these 
capabilities will increase the number of TRUCCs that can be effectively controlled 
by a single human operator.  The examples mentioned in each section above are 
starting points for further research.   
Investment in artificial semantic translation to support capability 3.1.  The 
Technical Compendium covers several examples of research initiatives that 
demonstrate a standard mereology and ontology required for true translation.   
Investment into research projects whose purpose is to determine the 
specific methods by which the human brain is able to operate to ensure the 
development of capability 3.2.  There are several ongoing projects that have 
begun this development, as discussed in the Technical Compendium. 
Begin the development of legal test cases to explore the ramifications of 
autonomous machines.  Specifically the issues of foreseeable harm and tort 
liability are of concern for autonomous vessel operation.  An example of a test 
case would be if the Google Autonomous Car were to crash into a fire hydrant.  
Legal processes must be in place to determine if the Google Corporation, the 
specific set of programmers, or some other entity, are culpable for the damage. 
At a higher level, policies must be in place to govern weapons release 
authorization for autonomous systems. If an autonomous machine kills a civilian, 
what are the ramifications to the system, the programmers and / or the 
supporting military unit? These complex legal and moral issues have significant 
ramifications for unmanned system development and should be examined 
concurrently with technology development. 
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Continue negotiations for creating an open architecture standard for 
connecting dissimilar machines.  Though open architecture will not help in 
achieving the third operational concept, it will help near-term integration of 
developing systems.   Integration managers can assist in this development, as 
discussed in detail in the Technical Compendium. 
The financial development of the supporting technologies should be 
shared amongst several stakeholders. The Surface Warfare community, Mine 
Warfare community, USMC and amphibious forces have common interest in the 
development of these supporting technologies. 
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X. CONCLUSION 
This report proposes an operational concept for a family of Unmanned 
Surface Vessels that integrates with manned and unmanned systems to address 
a broad spectrum of missions.  Unmanned Surface Vessels can be a force 
multiplier to the Fleet.  Maximum impact of unmanned systems is realized when 
the force structure is defined through long-term analysis, as proposed in this 
report.  A dedicated, long term, front-end analysis can provide increased combat 
efficiency and effectiveness for the future mix of manned and unmanned 
systems.  
The primary focus for USV development should center on the littoral 
missions.  The U.S. Navy is significantly vested in large multi-role ships for blue-
water, long range missions.  USVs executing littoral missions will free up the 
number of guided missile destroyers (and other assets) for blue-water missions, 
for which they are well suited.  Additionally, the requisite high operational 
availability and mid-mission reliability necessary for the USVs can be achieved 
through shorter duration littoral deployments and access to forward-deployed 
maintenance facilities.  This littoral operational concept is shown in the OV-1 














Figure 37.   TRUCC Conceptual Employment OV-1 
Mid-mission failures are critical elements of USV design.  The loss of 
control of a USV at sea creates a multitude of problems for the unit-level operator 
and combatant commander alike, particularly when the vessel contains sensitive 
military technology and weapons.  The reliability of these vessels should 
leverage best practices from communities with similar concerns, such as aviation 
and space systems.  Utilizing high Ao and reliability factors typical of aviation 
systems reduces the force structure required for combat capability, as shown for 
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incremental capabilities, as well as the mission requirements of disparate 
communities.  These four design reference missions and their associated 
communities of interest will facilitate incremental funding over time, with an eye 
towards complete integration of manned and unmanned vessels in the 40–50 
year timeline. 
 Logistics: Surface Warfare, USMC/amphibious forces, Military Sealift 
Command 
 Decoy transportation: Surface Warfare, USMC/amphibious forces 
 Mine Warfare: Mine Warfare, Surface Warfare 
 Multi-Threat Force Protection: Surface Warfare 
The common functional capabilities to execute these missions all require 
research and development.  All communities of interested in USVs should fund 
these core functional capabilities jointly to share in the costs and technological 
risk associated with autonomy development.  Integrating existing technologies to 
demonstrate and field USVs with one-to-one remote control (i.e. one operator to 
one vessel) is possible in the near term.  The technologies to support one-to-one 
remote control exist today; however, lack of funding and community support to 
integrate these technologies and demonstrate their capability is a major barrier to 
development of a TRUCC-like capability. 
Mid-and-far term research is required for the development of the 
necessary recursive thinking processes and semantic translation (as defined in 
the Roadmap Technical Compendium) to support the ultimate goal of true 
independent unmanned vessel operation.  This research should be actively 
conducted by agencies such as Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 




Development of USV operational concepts, such as the Tailorable Remote 
Unmanned Combat Craft, through front-end Systems Engineering analysis will 
pave the way for efficient development of a truly integrated manned-unmanned 
force structure through 2060 and beyond. 
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XI. ROADMAP TECHNICAL COMPENDIUM 
A. INTRODUCTION   
The following roadmap is a description of technologies and capabilities 
required to facilitate TRUCC design and deployment.  At the highest level, the 
roadmap is broken into three main operational concepts independent of mission 
as shown in Figure 41.  The first is manual remote control of an USV by a human 
to conduct a designated mission.  The second is the control of multiple USVs by 
one human operator.  The final concept is the completely autonomous operation 
of a group of USVs with no human interaction.  The operational concepts are 
sequential, meaning that the technologies required to execute the second 
concept require all of the technologies required for the first concept, and likewise 
for the third.  These concepts and their supporting technologies are explained in 
greater detail in the following sections.   
 
Figure 41.   Roadmap Operational Concepts 
Breaking down the development of the TRUCCs into these three 
operational concepts helps to show the effects of improvement to existing 
capabilities through technological improvements versus adding new capabilities 
through technological development.  The metric used to compare the different 
operational concepts is network externality.32  Network externality is a concept 
developed to describe the effects of information technology upon the value of a 
                                            
32 (Shankar, 2002) 
 108
product.  This concept requires an increase in value as additional nodes are 
added to the system.  An example of this effect is the telephone network.  
Initially, as more users or nodes are added to the network, the value of the 
telephone increases for all users because they are able to use it to contact more 
and more people.  Facebook is another example.  As more user pages are 
added, those using Facebook are better able to connect with their peers.  
Another aspect of network externality is the idea of saturation.  Saturation occurs 
due to various reasons, but is evidenced when the addition of nodes no longer 
improves but rather decreases value.  An example of a network that has reached 
saturation is the traffic system around Washington D.C.  Initially the network of 
highways allowed for greater numbers of people to commute into and out of the 
city as required.  As the number of people increased the road network reached 
saturation and the value began to decrease since the commute times for 
everyone increased.   
By examining each of the different operational concepts it is possible to 
compare the point at which each reaches saturation and observe the value each 
paradigm represents.  The definition of a node in each operational concept is 
different.  The node in operational concept #1 is a human operator controlling a 
single TRUCC.  For operational concept #2 a node is a human operator 
controlling several TRUCCs.  For operational concept #3 a node is each TRUCC 
by itself; there is no human operator since they are autonomous.     
B. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT #1 
Each node added to the environment has a specified sensor range and 
associated weapon coverage.  Within this defined area the human operator 
needs approximately 12.5 seconds to identify an incoming threat and activate a 
weapon if required.33  If an overlap of weapons coverage occurs without the  
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The difference is that if any other TRUCCs within the same node are 
within weapon range, the transmission time for targeting information is limited 
only by the processing speed of the TRUCCs.  The three-second delay still exists 
if TRUCCs in another node are to be activated.  Once the second node is 
activated, all available TRUCCs have the ability to become parallel shooters 
without any additional delay beyond that required for the human-to-human data 
transmission.   Saturation of effective parallel shooters will still occur; however, 
the final number of shooters is higher than in Case #1 because each node 
represents more TRUCCs available for engagement.   
Two other effects will help determine where the saturation point occurs:  
 As additional nodes are added to the network, the bandwidth 
requirements will increase. If there is not enough bandwidth 
available to transfer the targeting information between nodes or 
within nodes, the number of parallel shooters will be limited.  
 The human-to-machine interface efficiency; in this case a human is 
providing some decision-making input to the node.  If the number of 
TRUCCs an operator is controlling becomes so large that he or she 
cannot effectively process the volume of information, the delay for 
taking action will increase the saturation level of shooters.   
D. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT #3 
In this case the node that is closest to the target will conduct the detect-to-
engage sequence.  The minimum delay is 12.5 seconds assuming the machine 
is as capable as a human.  The number of parallel shooters is limited only by 
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Figure 45 indicates the possible advantages between the different 
operational concepts.  The point at which saturation occurs is different for each 
case.  The saturation point of the network indicates the maximum possible 
benefit that an operational concept can achieve.  No matter how many nodes you 
have using the Operational Concept #1 the maximum number of parallel 
shooters is thirty.  When Operational Concept #2 reaches saturation there are 
sixty parallel shooters.  The difference between the two concepts shows the 
added value of Operational Concept #2.  Figure 38 depicts the relationship 
between hypothetical data representing an estimation of saturation for the 
different operational concepts.  Further investigation and experiments of 
developing systems must be conducted in order to develop the true shape of 
these curves and therefore their relative value to the decision makers 
E. TIMELINE OF TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT  
The current state of existing capabilities places USVs at the early stages 
of the second operational concept.  The control of multiple USVs has been 
demonstrated but the systems are in very early stages of development.  The 
maximum human-to-USV control ratio has not been achieved.  The technologies 
required achieve the third operational concept are not available at this time, but it 
is highly likely that they will be available within the next five decades. 
F. SUPPORTING TECHNOLOGY DEFINITIONS     
1. Data Storage Capacity: Sufficient data storage capacity and speed 
of access and retrieval to support the TRUCC system when given commands 
from the remote operator and internal processes.   
2. Computer Processor: Sufficient speed for the network of TRUCCs 
to collect, process, and take required action within a human-equivalent time 
period, while ensuring timely and proper mission inputs are collected.  
Associated with the processor is the architecture, language, manufacturing 
process feature size, and chip yield. 
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3. Common Operating Language between the TRUCC and the 
Remote Operator: Communications in the same language to include localized 
definitions in order to fulfill this requirement without requiring additional 
translation software within the system.   
4. Wireless Communication Network: Sufficient bandwidth to support 
wireless communication within and from the network of TRUCCs.  
Communication from the TRUCCs is critical as recommendations are reported to 
the operator in order to take action.   
5. Rule-based Alarm Criteria: A list of actions within the system 
software including the ability to monitor, identify and report normal/abnormal 
states within the TRUCC/operator network. 
6. Status Monitoring Sensors: Sensors available to monitor the 
required systems within the TRUCC: Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HME) 
components of the TRUCC as well as the installed mission specific modules for 
errors providing real time system status to include correct position of the TRUCC 
in relation to a known geographic position as well as other TRUCCs within the 
network.  Data validity is a current issue with sensors which must be addressed, 
including latency of data as well as the system having knowledge of what sensor 
data is needed. 
7. Propulsion Technology: Propulsion technology is currently available 
which will satisfy mission requirements in both endurance as well as speed. 
8. Rule-based Decision Method Criteria: A list of actions within the 
system software to include the ability to control, collect, process, and take action 
on data from the network of TRUCC’s antennas, sensors, weapons, and other 
mission required peripheral devices to determine the appropriate course of 
action. 
9. External Sensors: Sensors available to collect system required 
information using installed peripheral devices, as well as the collection of data 
provided by other vessels within the network of TRUCCs in order to support the 
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TRUCC mission.  A few examples of the required sensors are communication 
antennas, Global Positioning System (GPS), Infrared Radiation (IR), Optical and 
other sensors which will provide the network of TRUCCs with sufficient 
situational awareness for timely and accurate mission input data.  Data validity is 
a current issue with sensors which must be addressed, including latency of data 
as well as the system having knowledge of what sensor data is needed. 
G. HIGH LEVEL DEPICTION OF CAPABILITIES 
 
Figure 46.   High-Level Operational Concept Flow Chart 
The Higher-Level Depiction of Operational Concepts represents a flow of 
capabilities over time employed in parallel with the development of the TRUCC, 
as shown in Figure 46.  The arrows between the concepts represent the 
formative development of technology from one capability to the next. 
Each operational concept is supported by several lower-level capabilities.  
These lower-level capabilities require some combination of the supporting 
technologies discussed earlier.  The lower-level depiction of capabilities focuses 
on the key capabilities required for the TRUCC with the understanding that the 
trade space includes many other capabilities that have not been addressed due 
to time constraints within the project.  The capabilities identified have been used 
to generate the roadmap for future TRUCC funding and development. 
The following section breaks down each operational concept by its 
supporting capabilities.  Each of the supporting capabilities is broken down into 
the supporting technologies.  Due to the fact that some supporting technologies 
are applicable to several supporting capabilities they appear several times. 
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1. Manual Control of Single Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
The capabilities required to achieve this operational concept are depicted 
in Figure 47.  With this technology, the user is able to remotely control a single 
Unmanned Surface Vehicle.  The ability to remotely conduct non-mission critical 
logistics transfer from one location to another within a non-hostile environment is 
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required to meet system requirements.  Rhode and Schwartz have an ISO-9001 
certification listing the U.S. Government as a user of its systems.35 
A second example of technology currently available to 
perform error detection is eiManager.  This technology is currently employed in 
the highly dynamic and important Automatic Teller Machine network.  Secure and 
timely communications is critical within this example of the function, and could be 
even more important within our network of TRUCCs in the area of anti-tamper 
and denial.  The product is available through the Fiserv Corporation and includes 
certain error correction algorithms which may apply to the fleet of TRUCCs and 
are examples of error correction within a network.36 
Another example of error detection with reference to the 
position of the TRUCC is the use of the Global Positioning System (GPS) to 
ensure proper TRUCC position to carry out the desired mission;37 establishing 
the exact location of the vehicle is critical to detecting a location error. 
The use of the Inertial Navigation System (INS) used to 
perform error detection in the position of the TRUCC in a GPS denied 
environment is yet another way to ensure the correct position of the TRUCC.38 
(2)  Demonstration Requirements.  A software program will 
need to be designed to a sufficient level of reliability and accuracy to ensure this 
capability satisfies the TRUCC requirements.  
(3)  Policy or Ethics Issues.  There are no ethics issues 
related to this capability.  Policy issues with this technology may exist within the 
decision to select the programming language for use in the network of TRUCCs. 
                                            
35 (Schwarz, 2011) 
36 (Jorgenson, 2010) 
37 (US Government, 2012) 
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operates in the Sydney Harbor as a ferry and operates using all four types of 
propulsion currently available.40 
 Fuel cell technology has been demonstrated on the 
Norwegian Sea supply ship Viking Lady, built by Eidesvik and its partners.  They 
have installed a 320 kilowatt molten carbonate fuel cell which operates on 
liquefied natural gas to propel the 5,900 metric ton vehicle.41 
(2) Demonstration Requirements. The requirement for 
power-to-propulsion conversion acceptance is such that the tested capability 
exceed TRUCC requirements by a yet to be determined percentage value before 
acceptance of this technology while meeting the designed to requirement of 
reliability. 
(3)  Policy or Ethics Issues.  Significant ethical issues 
surround this technology; some of the major issues are the acceptance of future 
advances in energy generation and use due to environmental as well as 
economic concerns.  There are significant policies issues regarding selection of 
power-to-propulsion technology. These issues include (but are not limited to), 
environmental concerns, allocation of government funding to private industry, 
and anti-trust concerns. 
c. Direction Control Capability  
The technologies required to achieve direction control capability are 
depicted in Figure 50.  The ability to provide maneuverability by redirecting the 




                                            
40 (Solar Sailor, 2012) 
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(3)  Policy or Ethics Issues.  No policy or ethics issues are 
involved in the direction control of the TRUCC. 
d. Generate Command Signals Capability  
The technologies required to achieve this capability are depicted in 
Figure 51.  The ability for the TRUCC to receive and translate remote operator 
commands into physical/nonphysical actions.  The capability includes the ability 
to control multiple peripheral devices within the TRUCC to complete the desired 
mission.  For example, the ability to control an optical sensor for Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) purposes while moving cargo from sea 
to shore, or the ability to remotely fire a gun system installed on the TRUCC 
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(2)  Demonstration Requirements.  The requirement to 
generate command signals is essential for the operator to be able to control the 
TRUCC.  The delivery acceptance criteria must meet an extremely high level of 
reliability and accuracy in order to satisfy the TRUCC requirements. 
(3)  Policy or Ethics Issues.  The ethics issue regarding the 
generating command signals rests in the worst-case scenario of an incorrect 
signal being generated and the operator taking action on the incorrect signal 
(e.g., fratricide or killing innocents).  The major policy issue with this technology 
is resolving accountability for machines incorrect application of deadly force.  
2. Control of Multiple Unmanned Surface Vehicles By-
Consent/By-Exception 
  The capabilities required to achieve this operational concept are depicted 
in Figure 52.  With this technology the user is able to remotely communicate with 
multiple USVs as they encounter unknown situations requiring direction from a 
human.  An example of employing this capability in the future would be the ability 
to conduct mine clearance operations within a hostile environment.  Mine 
clearance is a dull and dangerous task perfect for unmanned systems.  In this 
example the network of USVs would be tasked with locating mines within a pre-
established area.  The USVs would continue to search the area without human 
direction until a mine is discovered, at which time the human would provide 









2.0 Supporting Capabilities 
 
Figure 52.   Control of Multiple Unmanned Surface Vehicles By-Consent/By-Exception 
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a. Gather Mission Inputs Capability 
The technologies required to achieve this capability are depicted in 
Figure 53.  The ability to collect and process all mission requirements in order to 
execute the desired mission.  Mission requirements in this capability include 
navigation obstruction avoidance, following remote operator guidance, and 





















2.1 Supporting Technologies 
 
Figure 53.   Gather Missions Inputs 
 (1)  Examples of Gather Mission Inputs.  An example 
depicting the capability of processing collected information is currently fulfilled at 
a low level of performance using software programs composed of multiple if-then  
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statements which will place the consequences in a priority queue awaiting 
corrective action.  ColorForth semantic programing language employs this type of 
function and is available and released for unlimited use.44 
 The Fleet Class Common Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
(CUSV) built by Textron Systems has demonstrated the control of two unmanned 
surface vehicles by one operator and over 60 support personnel.45  The CUSV 
platform employs AAI’s command and control system.  This system has the 
ability to gather, and process mission inputs successfully but has yet to be 
proven to do perform this at a near-human speed.46 
(2)  Demonstration Requirements.  In order to ensure this 
capability satisfies the TRUCC requirement a software program will need to be 
designed to a sufficient level of reliability and accuracy to accept and process 
inputs at a near-human speed. 
(3)  Policy or Ethics Issues.  The list of ethics issues is vast; 
at the top of the list is that of an unmanned system making its own decisions in 
order to fulfill mission requirements.  Another issue is determining the level of 
error that is tolerable in an automated system.   
b. Rules of Engagement Orders/Heuristics Capability 
The technologies required to achieve this capability are depicted in 
Figure 54.  The ability to translate a specific set of Rules of Engagement into a 




                                            
44 (Moore, 2012) 
45 (AAI, 2011) 

















 (1)  Examples of Rules of Engagement Orders/Heuristics.  
An example which has the capability of determining courses of action with regard 
to ROE using semantic programing language is currently fulfilled at a low level of 
performance using software programs composed of countless if-then statements.  
ColorForth semantic programing language employs this type of function and is 
available and released for unlimited use.47 
 Another sematic programming language which is available to 
assist in fulfilling this requirement is the use of the J2EE® with the use of 
peripheral sensors. 
 A sensor available to assist in ROE is the use of the 
Automatic Identification System (AIS).  The International Maritime Organization 
regulation requires that AIS provide information including the ship's identity, type, 
position, course, speed, navigational status and other safety-related information.  
Similarly, AIS automatically sends updated information to appropriately equipped 
shore stations, other ships and aircraft; automatically receives such information 
from similarly fitted ships and monitors and tracks ships.48  The same system is 
employed in aircraft and has a positive identification function used by the military. 
(2)  Demonstration Requirements.  In order to ensure this 
capability satisfies the TRUCC requirement a software program will need to be 
designed to a near-perfect level of reliability and accuracy due to the authority 
given to an unmanned system to provide a recommendation to the operator for 
weapons release authority. 
(3)  Policy or Ethics Issues.  An ethical issue with regards to 
ROE is allowing a computer system to make recommendations on ROE to an 
operator based on the programmer’s inputs and interpretation.  In the case of a  
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saturated environment, the operator may choose to automatically consent to the 
computer’s decision to use lethal force.  No policy issues exist with regards to 
Rules of Engagement Orders/Heuristics. 
c. Perform Triage Capability 
The technologies required to achieve this capability are depicted in 
Figure 55.  The ability for a network of USVs to prioritize consequences within 
the network of TRUCCs for correction by the operator. 
2.3 Supporting Technologies: 















Figure 55.   Perform Triage 
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 (1)  Examples of Perform Triage.  An example of a capability 
which will perform triage with regards to the network of TRUCCs using semantic 
programing language is currently fulfilled at a low level of performance using 
software programs composed of countless if-then statements.  ColorForth 
semantic programing language employs this type of function and is available and 
released for unlimited use.49 
 Another example of a system performing triage is the Mars 
Rover software Autonomous Exploration for Gathering Increased Science 
(AEGIS), which has been operating on the Mars rover Opportunity since 
December 2009.  The software has the ability to autonomously direct 
Opportunity’s cameras towards objects of interest.50 
(2)  Demonstration Requirements.  In order to ensure this 
capability satisfies the TRUCC requirement a software program will need to be 
designed to a sufficient level of reliability and accuracy. 
(3)  Policy or Ethics Issues.  There are no ethics or policy 
issues related to this capability. 
d. Determine Potential Threats Capability 
The technologies required to achieve this capability are depicted in 
Figure 56.  The ability of the TRUCC to search for, detect, track and recommend 
engagement of a threat.  Included is the ability for the TRUCC system to identify 
friendly/neutral contacts from enemy contacts in order to prevent noncombatant 
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2.4 Supporting Technologies 
‐  
Figure 56.   Determine Potential Threats Capability 
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 (1)  Examples of Determine Potential Threats.  An example 
of a capability which will determine courses of action with regards to threats 
using semantic programing language is currently fulfilled at a low level of 
performance using software programs composed of countless if-then statements.  
ColorForth semantic programing language employs this type of function and is 
available and released for unlimited use.51 
 Another sematic programming language which is available to 
assist in fulfilling this requirement is the use of the J2EE® with the use of 
peripheral sensors, although this is a slower process than using ColorForth. 
 AIS can also be used for this capability.  The information 
provided by AIS can also be used to determine if a contact is a threat as well as 
assist in applying the rules of engagement.   
 Radars, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Measurement and 
Signature Intelligence (MASINT), and optical sensors play a key role in 
establishing hostile contacts.  Once the identity of a contact is known the 
computer can access the database, determine what type of threat the contact is, 
and relay this information to the remote operator for further direction. 
(2)  Demonstration Requirements.  To ensure this capability 
fulfills the TRUCC requirement it must be thoroughly tested to ensure a high level 
of accuracy as well as reliability at near-human speeds.   
(3)  Policy or Ethics Issues.  There are no ethical issues with 
the use of this capability as a human is still in the loop and no engagement 
orders are based on this capability alone.  A major policy issue with this 
capability is the selection of the semantic programming language to be used in 
the network of TRUCCs. 
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e. Determine Potential Course Obstructions Capability 
The technologies required to achieve this capability are depicted in 
Figure 57.  The ability to use potential threat data including threat speed and 






















2.5 Supporting Technologies 
‐ 



















Figure 57.   Determine Potential Course Obstructions Capability V 1.0 
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 (1)  Examples of Determine Potential Course Obstructions.  
The capability of determining courses of action with regards to threats using 
semantic programing language is currently fulfilled at a low level of performance 
using software programs composed of countless if-then statements.  ColorForth 
semantic programing language employs this type of function and is available 
commercially off the shelf.52 
 Another sematic programming language which is available to 
assist in fulfilling this requirement is the use of the J2EE® with the use of 
peripheral sensors, although this is a slower process then using ColorForth. 
 A sensor available to assist in ROE is the use of the 
Automatic Identification System (AIS).  The International Maritime Organization 
regulation requires that AIS shall provide information including the ship's identity, 
type, position, course, speed, navigational status and other safety-related 
information.  Similarly, AIS shall automatically update information to appropriately 
equipped shore stations, other ships and aircraft; receive automatically such 
information from similarly fitted ships; monitoring and tracking ships.53  The same 
system is employed in aircraft and has a positive identification function used by 
the military. 
 Sound Navigation and Ranging (SONAR), Radio Detection 
Ranging (RADAR), SIGINT, MASINT, and optical sensors as well play a key role 
as a sensor in detecting contacts.  Once the identity of a contact is known the 
computer can access the database and determine the type of threat the contact 
is and relay this information to the remote operator for further direction or if 
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(2)  Demonstration Requirements.  To ensure this capability 
fulfills the TRUCC requirement it must be tested to ensure a high level of 
accuracy as well as reliability at near-human speeds.   
(3)  Policy or Ethics Issues.  There are no ethical issues with 
the use of this capability as it is merely used to avoid a threat.  A major policy 
issue with this capability is the selection of the semantic programming language 
to be used in the network of TRUCCs. 
f. Generate Immediate Actions List Capability 
The technologies required to achieve this capability are depicted in 
Figure 58.  The ability to generate a sequential list of actions for autonomous 
TRUCC action as well as operator input.  This action list shall be based on 
TRUCC availability, system availability, threat location, and threat capability, in 
order to maximize the efficacy of the network of TRUCCs.  The ability for the 














2.6 Supporting Technologies 
‐  






 (1)  Examples of Generate Immediate Actions List.  One 
example of a system which is able to generate its own immediate action list is 
called Self-Organizing Incremental Neural Network (SOINN), which is able to 
think, learn, and act, by itself.  The Hasegawa Group from Tokyo Institute of 
Technology has developed this robot prototype which performs tasks quickly and 
accurately even when there is a slight change in the environment.54 
 Another example of a system generating an immediate 
actions list is the Mars Rover software AEGIS, which has been operating on the 
Mars rover Opportunity since December 2009.  The software has the ability to 
autonomously direct Opportunity’s cameras towards objects of interest.55 
(2)  Demonstration Requirements.  To ensure this capability 
fulfills the TRUCC requirement it must be tested to ensure a high level of 
accuracy as well as reliability at near-human speeds. 
(3)  Policy or Ethics Issues.  There are no ethical issues with 
the use of this capability as it is merely used to avoid a threat.  A major policy 
issue with this capability is the selection of the semantic programming language 
to be used in the network of TRUCCs. 
3. Autonomous Operation 
The technologies required to achieve this capability are depicted in Figure 
59.  With this technology the TRUCCs are able to operate without a human.  The 
TRUCCs are able to communicate to each other and other actors in the 
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Figure 59.   Autonomous Operation 
H. TRANSLATION OF NATURAL SEMANTIC STRUCTURES TO 
ARTIFICIAL SEMANTIC STRUCTURES   
The ability to translate natural to artificial semantic structures is necessary 
because any robot that is expected to operate autonomously has to be able to 
interact with the environment and humans, as well as within the context of 
situations.  Observing and interpreting physical phenomena within that 
environment is an issue of sensor capability and ability to interpret that sensorial 
data to extract a sufficiency of information from which to provide necessary and 
sufficient controls to maintain an acceptable level of survivability.  An example of 
an environment is the surface of the ocean upon which the machine floats.  The 
physical characteristics of the environment that need to be observed are the 
range to other objects floating on the surface and the electromagnetic signals 
they are emitting.  The machine has to be able to reconcile the observations with 
its knowledge of the situational context.  Objects emitting a particular 
electromagnetic signal require a different type of reaction than objects not 
emitting a signal.  For a human, the sematic representations of the objects 
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emitting signals might be ships while those that are not emitting signals might be 
icebergs.  The robot has to be able to understand these concepts or it will not 
understand how to react.   
Another key issue is that the machine will have to be able to communicate 
and understand other agents within that environment, humans and machines.  
Humans generally only communicate through natural semantic expressions.  If 
the machine is unable to “grasp” the nuances of human speech like metaphors or 
cannot interoperate with other machines, it will not be able to take non-
standardized orders or inputs and turn them into actions.  The complicating factor 
that inhibits this overall inoperability is coupled with the lack of ability to quickly 
and reliably “converse” in a meaningful manner.  An example of this is “Engage 
the Enemy!”  Until the machine has the capability to take the abstract concept of 
enemy and correctly apply it to the targets around itself it will always require 
human direction.   
1. How 
In order to explain the necessary steps required to achieve the capability 
to translate between natural and artificial semantic expressions several terms 
and concepts must be explained and developed.  These terms are semantics, 
ontology, and mereology.   
Semantics is a study of how people use objects and processes to 
represent abstract concepts.  An object can be any physical object that is used to 
convey or receive information.  For example, the word “DOG” is an object that 
represents a member of the canine species.  Another example is the painting 
The Scream by Edvard Munch which represents the artist’s view on the world.56  
A process is any combination of activities that are used to convey information or 
carry out the acts.  The most common process used to convey information is 
speaking.  Another example that is very familiar is making different faces to 
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express different emotions, like smiling to indicate happiness.  The concepts 
represented by these objects and processes can be physical objects like a “table” 
or they can be non-physical such as abstract concepts like “freedom” or 
“oppression.”  Semantics are important because it helps explain how humans 
interact with each other and make decisions.   
Understanding how meaning is constructed is very important because it 
leads to the construction of the personal framework or ontology that a person 
uses to make decisions.  Ontology is “an explicit formal specification of how to 
represent the objects, concepts and other entities that are assumed to exist in 
some area of interest and the relationships that hold among them.57”  
All humans create and use a personal ontological structure to interact with 
other people and animals.  The development of this ontology begins at birth and 
continues throughout our lives.  An example of the ontological development is a 
baby crying.  After birth a baby has no reference or framework to explain all of 
the sensations he or she (or it) feels like hunger, cold, hot, or pain.  Babies seem 
to have a limited selection of choices when trying to interact with the world to 
effect a change in their “state.”  They can sit there and suffer until the problem 
goes away or cry until something or someone fixes the situation. 
As humans grow older they encounter and acquire more abstract 
concepts that are incorporated into their ontological structure.  An effective 
method of acquiring these abstract concepts is through language.  Language is 
not the only method, but words are the dominant objects that humans use to 
define and transmit ideas.  This means of communication can be seen in the fact 
that new words are constantly being created as humans invent or discover new 
symbols as they interact with their environment.  The ontological development of 
each human is, in part, governed by his or her environment and experiences.   
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Semantics are important to this process of ontological development 
because every language has different rules, which in turn affect how the 
ontological structure of that person is formed.  The importance of semantics to 
ontological structures can most clearly be seen in how difficult it is to translate 
written objects from one language to another.  “Sumimasen” in Japanese does 
not mean just mean “thank you” in English.  A more accurate translation is “I 
have received a [debt] from you and under modern economic arrangements I can 
never repay you; I am sorry to be placed in such a position.”58 The fundamental 
idea of indebtedness that is a main part of the Japanese speaker’s ontological 
structure is not present in the same form as the English speaker.  Due to this 
there is a mismatch in the abstract concepts represented by the different objects 
“Sumimasen” and “Thank You.”   
True translation between different languages requires that there be at 
least one person or agent in the situation who has all of the ontological structures 
present in both parties and can adjust the objects to best match the concepts 
present in each party’s personal ontological structure. 
Development of an ontological structure is premised on the parts of 
ontology that relate to the totality of the topic.  Across the spectrum of local and 
coalition needs, the ontology must affect a wider, more responsive structure to 
accommodate special needs in a most general sense.  The example of 
translating one language into another language is directly applicable to this issue.  
Converting one language to another language, then to a third language, is a 
typical approach used today.  However, a meta-ontology, to which all languages 
map, provides the most efficient translation from language to language.  To that 
end, mereology is the study of how a part relates to the whole and how parts 
within a whole relate to each other.  In other words, mereology is an attempt to 
break something down into its most basic components and define how those 
components are related.  The concept of “mereology” was developed by 
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Stanislaw Leśniewski.  He proposed that the universe is made up of only two 
types of categories or parts.  A possible example of this is that the Universe is 
composed of objects and of processes as extended through the development of 
subjective and objective ontology.59  The specific definition or form of those two 
parts is important to semantic representations at this level of analysis, but 
ultimately the mereology of objects and processes must be able to explain and 
describe all things required for fully autonomous operations. 
A standard mereology is important because only by describing the totality 
of items required to carry out autonomous missions, at the most fundamental and 
abstract level, is it possible to bridge the gap between natural semantic 
structures.  Before the development of machines, a standardized mereology was 
not required because all humans are equipped with several basic ontological 
structures based on intrinsic common structure of our thinking.  Hunger, pain, 
anger, and sadness are all sensations that all humans feel.  This commonality 
helps us communicate without a common language even if most of the semantic 
expressions have no reciprocal match up.  Translation between humans only 
fails when the basic design of the body is different than the norm.  Trying to 
describe the color blue to a blind man is impossible because the blind man may 
not have the ontological structures related to vision because his eyes do not 
function correctly.  Another example is trying to communicate with autistic 
children whose brains process incoming signals in a non-standard manner.  The 
structures might be present but they are either inoperative or operative at a level 
which is less than necessary.   
The problem of translation becomes even more difficult when it comes to 
machines because they have almost none of the same ontological structures as 
humans.  Programming languages such as C++, RUBY, and JAVA do not 
represent a true translation of a human language to machine language.  A 
human has to first translate naturally occurring semantic objects into artificial 
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semantic arguments.  For example in C#, the string of objects “int VAL1  = 1;” 
means the object VAL1 can only be an integer and in this case it equals 1.  The 
person writing this command knew what ontological structures the computer 
could use and ensured that all ambiguity was removed.  The C# compiler then 
translates int VAL1 = 1 into the machine code commands to create a location on 
the hard drive where the object VAL1, its value 1, and its type integer are stored 
for later referencing.   
The previous example is a very simple case.  There are several examples 
of products and designs that are very good at handling a lot of the ambiguity in 
natural semantic expressions such as the Siri® program loaded on the iPhone 
4S®.  This software program interprets human speech and translates that into 
actions.  The program is far more versatile than trying to program in C# but it is 
very easy to find the limits of the Siri program in being able to understand natural 
language.  A recent and controversial example of these limits is the inability of 
Siri to locate rape crisis resources when asked.60 The programmers did not add 
the appropriate ontological structures for the program to react to this query by the 
user.  The problem is there are still structures in the human ontological structure 
that the machines ontological structure does not have.   
True translation between natural and artificial structures can only be 
accomplished when there is a single mereology upon which an ontology is built, 
that includes both human and machine structures, trying to add to the ontologies 
of both parties until every structure is present is not sufficient if the mereology on 
which they are based is not the same. 
In conclusion, there are three steps required for translation between 
natural and artificial semantic structures.  The first step is to define a single 
mereology which all agents agree will be encountered in the environment.  The 
second step is to expand the standard mereology into an ontology that includes 
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all structures necessary to carry out autonomous missions.  The third step is to 
define standard set of semantic rules for describing both natural and machine 
semantic structures so that they can be parsed into the standardized ontology.   
2. Issues for Consideration 
The following are unresolved issues in the translation problem space.   
 As stated in the description a standard mereology should be established in 
order to ensure that the natural and artificial ontologies have no areas 
where translation could not occur.  This task will require that all parties 
participating in the mission environment agree to the component parts and 
their definitions.   
 Based on the common mereology, an ontology must be designed that 
contains all natural and artificial structures required for the mission 
environment.  The creation of the standard ontology, and the 
determination of which structures to include, presents one of the greatest 
challenges for the desired translation.  Perhaps more importantly, 
however, the choice of included artificial structures directly impacts the 
design of the hardware supporting the translation.  For example, different 
processors like Intel or Apple processors use different machine 
languages.  Any designed ontology must be able compatible with the host 
processor’s machine language in order to execute the translation program. 
 The fact that the translation ontology, once complete, is linked to a 
particular machine language poses a limit to the interoperability of the 
system.  For example, lack of a common chipset for the embedded 
systems in the mission environment may introduce a good chance of 
translation error.  In this manner, the choice of chipset is a difficult one 
since performance is not the only factor.  Since the end customer is the 
government, the choice will have several political implications that have to 
be considered.   
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 The implementation of the translation software requires that there be 
enough data storage and processing speed to carry out the translation at 
a rate at least as fast as a human, estimated at 1 x 1014 operations per 
second (roughly 1680 GHz).61  Current technology is not able to produce 
the required computational speeds and storage at a size small enough to 
be widely used.  IBM’s Watson computer is one of the most advanced 
natural semantic processors, and reflects the current state-of-the-art in 
such translation tasks.  Watson has “15 terabytes of RAM, 2,880 
processor cores and can operate at 80 teraflops.” 62  It is roughly the size 
of 10 refrigerators.63  The size and complexity of Watson would make it 
unfeasible as a mobile combat or ISR platform.  A significant jump in the 
miniaturization of information technology is required before natural 
semantic translation can be widely used in the battle space.  The 
miniaturization may not require that the processors reach the size of the 
human brain (roughly 1300 g) but a significant improvement is required.   
3. Demonstration Requirements 
In order for a machine to prove that it has semantic translation capability 
sufficient to interact with all actors in the environment a Turing test is required.  
The machine must be compared to a control of humans who are given the same 
contextual information and semantic structures.  If the machine has sufficient 
natural semantic translation capability the task list it generates must be 
equivalent to the task list created by the humans in the same situation.   
I. RECURSIVE THINKING PROCESS 
True autonomy requires that the autonomous agent is able to use its body 
of knowledge to accomplish a task using recursive and iterative thinking 
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processes within a schema or model of the contextual environment.  Current 
rule-based programming techniques are able to apply a large set of problem-
solving techniques using trial and error.  This process is iterative.  If the first 
technique fails the second technique is applied.  The machine applies each of the 
techniques available to the problem in sequence.  The problem with this method 
is that if all of the different techniques the machine is able to use do not work, 
then the machine cannot proceed with its assigned task.  At this point, a 
recursive process is required in order to generate a new set of problem solving 
techniques to be applied, not just permutations and modification of failed problem 
methods.   
Humans are able to apply recursive thinking to bridge the gap between a 
set of failed problem solving techniques to another possible set of problem 
solving techniques.  An example of the use of recursive thinking can be seen in 
the recent search for the treasure ship Soleil D’Orient.64  The searchers used 
recursive thinking to apply their knowledge of the ship’s course, environmental 
conditions, and other factors to create an area that should be searched.  The 
searchers used an iterative method to effectively search the proposed area using 
trial and error.  At the end of the iterative search process the treasure was not 
located in the search area.  The searchers at this point turned to a recursive 
process based on the schema or model of the situation to create a new search 
area.  If the ship was not in the proposed search area then it must be somewhere 
else.  Based on the model of the ship, the environmental conditions, and the 
knowledge where the ship was presumed not to be located the searchers 
decided to search on land rather than the ocean bottom.  Given a new search 
area the iterative process was applied again which eventually led to the 
discovery of the ship’s location.65  
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The difficulty with recursive processes is that they are not based on rules.  
In the treasure-hunting example, the decision to search on land seems logical in 
hindsight, although several experts in ship driving had indicated that it was 
extremely risky and therefore untenable for the captain of the Soleil D’Orient to 
have beached his ship.  In order to arrive at the correct search method, the 
searchers were required to ignore credible data with no logical justifications.  In 
this manner, humans are able to generate new courses of action without a logical 
set of inputs. 
The recursive process is not perfect and does not always lead to a 
solution.  If the agent using a recursive process does not have all the knowledge 
required, it may never reach a solution to the problem.  The difference between a 
human and a machine is that with recursive processes the human is able to 
continue to try new problem solving methods without inputs from other agents.  
Truly autonomous machines must be able to execute some level of recursive 
thinking in order to eliminate the human operator completely.   
1. HOW 
The main barrier to achieving recursive thinking is that currently the 
methods or mechanisms by which humans conduct recursive thinking is 
unknown.  There are several open questions in terms of how humans actually 
conduct this process, including the one of how the brain structure is linked to its 
function or performance.  Neurobiologists have been able to identify the specific 
chemical and physical structures comprising a synapse, but have not been able 
to conclusively identify how those structures relate to learning.66   
There are two bodies of thought on the question of how the brain 
operates.  The first is the connectionist idea that problem solving is based on 
how the synapses are connected.  As more connections are added the better the 
problem solving capability.  In this theory of brain function there are no separate 
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controllers for higher brain function.67  Connectionist theory has been popular 
because two of the knowledge application techniques derived from it, adaptive 
resonance theory and back propagation, have accounted for most of the gains 
associated with machine learning.  The problem with these techniques is that a 
human conducts the metacognition process for the machine by determining the 
values of various input variables.  The connectionist view is also limited because 
it posits that there must always be a feedback signal necessary for learning to 
occur. The requirement of some form of feedback is not part of human 
metacognition and knowledge application since humans are more than able to 
act without any feedback from their actions.  The lack of feedback is shown in the 
proximate causal response most humans exhibit.68  A human uses their sensory 
organs to take in information and use it to anticipate the environment around 
them.69   
The second body of thought is the controller theory of the brain.  The 
controller theory argues that there are several executive controllers in the brain 
that control and regulate other parts of the brain.70  The controller body of theory 
requires that there is some type of control structure like a hierarchy of executive 
and subservient subsystems.  The Controller Theory has several weaknesses.  
Research has indicated that the brain controllers are most likely organized in 
heterarchical architecture rather than a hierarchical architecture.  The different 
controlling functions have multiple different types of connections between them 
so that depending on the function being enacted the executive controller can 
change; there is no single top-down structure that works for all operations as in a 
hierarchy.  In other words, the controller in charge changes depending on the 
operation the brain is trying to implement.  The problem is that researchers are  
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not completely sure how the brain interacts during different operations.  Many 
different actions have been identified, but there is no comprehensive theory to 
explain all interactions that occur in the brain for learning to occur. 
The actual neural architecture of the brain is probably something between 
the connectionist and controller theory bodies of thought.  Animal and human 
learning processes though, are the only working examples of autonomous 
learning existing on the planet.  
Another barrier to autonomous learning is computer hardware limits.  
There is no consensus to calculate and measure the computational abilities of 
the human brain, but one approximation comparing the size of the retina to the 
brain puts the value at 100 million MIPS (millions of instructions per second) or 1 
x 1014 operations per second.  Based on this value there are several computers 
that have surpassed this limit with the Chinese Tianhe-1A clocking in at 2.5 
petaflops or 2.5 x 1015  operations per second.71  The problem with these 
computers is that even with today’s technology they are the size of small 
buildings.  The concept of intelligent machines requires that they can interact with 
our environment in a manner similar to humans.  By implication, this means that 
those machines need to be similar in size to humans.  The average human brain 
is roughly 1300g.72  A computer the size of a building clearly does not meet this 
criterion. 
2. Issues for Consideration 
The following are unresolved issues in the recursive thinking process 
problem space.  
 What level of metacognition is required for machines to operate 
autonomously?  Humans are not infallible and occasionally make 
mistakes.  The expectation of most policy makers is that machines must 
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perform nearly perfectly in order for them to operate autonomously.  That 
expectation does not apply in most real world situations, especially in the 
uncertainty of combat situations, and even more especially in cases where 
such objective metrics of a “right answer” are unavailable or 
unreasonable.   
 Who is responsible for human-like machines?  The legal implications of 
the liabilities created by employment of these machines must be 
addressed.  A possible precedent may exist in the treatment and law 
regarding pets, such as dogs.  Many states have instituted laws where the 
owner is automatically liable for any injuries caused by a dog.73  Other 
states have instituted a rule that looks at the prior history of a dog to 
determine if the owner should be liable.  Some of the criteria examined in 
these cases is whether the dog has been trained to fight, or if the dog 
actively threatens people.74  It is important to determine the specific rules 
regarding autonomous machine before they are deployed in an 
environment where they could cause injury to humans.   
 What level of recursive thinking is required for TRUCCs?  Not all humans 
have the same knowledge, nor do they have the same ability to conduct 
recursive thinking to generate new problem solving methods.  Does the 
machine merely require the abilities of an average ten-year-old or must it 
possess the abilities of a genius thinker to satisfy the preconditions of 
recursive thinking?  Given the current state-of-the-art and our nascent 
understanding of how to implement recursive thinking capabilities in 
machines, it is difficult to estimate the cost for development of increased 
recursive thinking ability in future machines. 




3. Demonstration Requirements 
The machine must be able to pass a classical Turing test.  A Turing test is 
an experiment that is designed to prove the presence of “mind, thought, or 
intelligence in an entity.”75  The machine, when given the same knowledge and 
tasks, must be able to continually cycle through the recursive and iterative 
processes without human assistance.  Each time through the cycle, the machine 
must devise and execute new problem solving methodologies to reach a 
previously undiscovered objective in the same manner as a human. 
4. Recommendations 
Based on the analysis of current technologies and capabilities there are 
several recommendations. 
 Increase investment and continued development of detailed rule sets for 
capabilities 2.1 through 2.6.  The logic and low-level autonomy 
represented by these capabilities are still in their technological infancy.  
Improvements in these capabilities will increase the number of UXVs that 
can be effectively controlled by a single human operator.  The increase 
will, in turn, raise the level at which saturation will occur in terms of 
network externality.  The examples mentioned in each section are good 
starting points for further research.   
 Increase investment into research projects focused on the development of 
more effective natural to artificial semantic translation to support capability 
3.1.  The developers of the Semantic Web have made great strides in 
establishing a standard mereology and ontology required for true 
translation.76   
                                            
75 (Oppy & Dowe, 2011) 
76 (Mao, Peng, & Spring, 2010, p. 2) 
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 Increase investment into research projects highlighting the insights 
afforded by cognitive neuroscience and deeper understanding of the 
human brain in support of capability 3.2.  There are several ongoing 
projects, including, for example, the projects and ideas mentioned in the 
2007 Future Challenges for the Science and Engineering of Learning July 
23-25 Final Workshop Report.77 
 Begin the development of legal test cases to explore the ramifications of 
autonomous machines, specifically spotlighting the issues of foreseeable 
harm and tort liability.  An illustrative legal thought experiment would be to 
identify the liable party if the Google autonomous car crashes into a fire 
hydrant. Would the Google company itself be held responsible, or perhaps 
the team of programmers who implemented the faulty logic would be 
faulted?  Of relevance to military autonomous systems, if an autonomous 
machine kills a civilian, should just the offending machine be destroyed, if 
at all, or should all machines loaded with the same decision making 
software be recalled and/or de-activated? 
 Continue pursuit of an open architecture standard for connecting dissimilar 
machines.  Though open architecture will not help in achieving full 
autonomy, it will help near-term integration of developing foundational 
systems.  As discussed earlier in the translation discussion, a meta-
ontology structure can be useful for facilitating this integration.  The Global 
Information Network Architecture (GINA) programming structure is an 




                                            
77 (Douglas & Sejnowski, 2007) 
78 (Tudor, Tinsely, & Busalacchi, p. 2)  
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XII. MISSION EFFECTIVENESS TECHNICAL COMPENDIUM 
A. PURPOSE 
The Mission Effectiveness Model has two main purposes.  The first 
purpose was to determine which physical characteristics of the TRUCC had the 
most affect upon mission success.  The second purpose was to act as a tool to 
determine the effectiveness of proposed TRUCC designs created by the Mission 
Vehicle Model. 
B. MODEL 1.0 FACTOR EXPLORATION DESIGN 
1. TRUCC Factor Selection 
The TRUCC factor selection started first with the creation of a Design 
Reference Mission (DRM) in which to place the TRUCCs and the attacking force.  
The DRM was created so that the TRUCCs act as a defensive force for a HVU 
against a swarm of incoming enemies of varying capabilities.  Using the 
experience of the group and the DRM a causal diagram (Figure 60) was 
developed to show the possible interactions of agent capabilities.  The red and 
blue factors listed in the diagram are the independent characteristics of the 
TRUCC and the attackers in the DRM.  All of these factors combine to determine 
the values of the secondary factors in green.  These factors combined with 
additional independent factors to determine the tertiary factors (shown in black) 
where the Measures of Effectiveness for the system are determined.  A more 







































Figure 60.   Causal Diagram 
After examining the causal diagram and comparing it to the capabilities of 
the MANA software, seven parameters were investigated: 
1. Sensor Detection Range 
2. Number of TRUCCs 
3. TRUCC Speed 
4. Weapon Range 
5. Weapon PK 
6. Weapon Firing Rate 
7. Sensor Detection Probability 
TRUCC geographic distribution was not selected as a factor for 
investigation because any attempts at optimizing system performance based on 
positioning is reflective of tactics, rather than system capability.  In order to 
remove the geographic distribution of the TRUCCs as a factor the TRUCCs 
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always begin each simulation in a screening formation around the high value unit 
at roughly 2000 meters.  It is assumed that the defending force has no prior 
knowledge of the attacking force so there is no positioning along a specific threat 
axis.  This basic screening formation serves as a plausible tactical employment 
regime to baseline TRUCC performance. The effect of attacker stealth capability 
was accounted for by adjusting the detection rate of the TRUCCs sensor so that 
even if the attacker is within sensor range, it was not immediately available for 
targeting.  
Each of these factors was given upper and lower bounds in order to 
facilitate a screening experiment.  The factors and their values against a 
particular attacker type are summarized in Table 21.  It should be noted that the 
sensor detection range, weapon range, and weapon firing rate are different 
against the FAC/FIAC threat because it is assumed that that type threat cannot 
be engaged with a missile system and a gun type system must be used.   
Table 21.   TRUCC Factor Values 
No. 
Scenarios  ASCM  LSF  FAC/FIAC 
Blue USV  Min  Max  Min  Max  Min  Max 
1  Number of TRUCCs  20  60  20  60  20  60 
2  Speed of TRUCC (m/s)  10  50  10  50  10  50 
3  Sensor Detection Range (m)  5000  15000  5000  15000  200  3000 
4  Sensor Detect Probability  0.5  0.9  0.5  0.9  0.5  0.9 
5  Weapon Range (m)  5000  15000  5000  15000  200  2500 
6  Weapon Pk  0.25  0.75  0.25  0.75  0.05  0.1 
7  Weapon Firing Rate ( sec)  10.02  100.2  10.02  100.2  1  2 
2. Attacker Capabilities 
The attacker capabilities were chosen based on several assumptions.  
The first assumption was that the attacking force was disposable and that 
preservation of those assets was not a high priority.  The second assumption 
was that the attackers were only equipped to kill the HVU and would not target 
the TRUCCs.  The attackers, though, were advanced enough that they were 
equipped with sensors capable of detecting the TRUCCs and evading them.   
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Per the DRM, the different types of attacker are anti-ship cruise missiles, 
low slow flyers, and Fast Attack Craft / Fast Inshore Attack Craft.  ASCM and 
LSFs can be engaged with missiles but FAC/FIAC cannot.  The capabilities of 
each attacker are listed in Table 22.  
The LSF and the FAC/FIAC attackers can exhibit two distinct types of 
behavior; smart or dumb.  Dumb attackers do not try to avoid the TRUCCs, even 
if they detect them.  This behavior simulates attackers that drive towards the 
HVU regardless of defender tactics or capabilities.  Smart attackers attempt to 
avoid the TRUCCs while still trying to reach the HVU.  These different behaviors 
represent two possible attacking system behaviors.  There is a virtually infinite 
variety of tactics, geographic and temporal distributions that could be utilized by 
swarm attacks.  These two behaviors are an attempt to constrain the problem to 
a workable variable space.  The time constraints of the project prevented the use 
of a greater number of threat systems combinations. 
Of note, missiles always exhibit dumb behavior.  It is assumed that missile 
evasive maneuvering in response to defender tactics is limited by physics, 
material strength of the airframe, and ASCM onboard processing and sensing 
capabilities. In order to execute smart behavior, an ASCM would require onboard 
sensors and processing necessary to generate evasive maneuvering of a 
magnitude necessary to influence defensive weapon performance.  This is 
deemed unlikely, given the limits of high performance missile design constraints.  
The impact of pre-programmed terminal maneuvering schemes is effectively 
modeled through variation of the TRUCC weapon Pk.  
The characteristics of threat systems were derived from the performance 
of high-technology fielded systems of today.  The underlying assumption was 
that the difficult-to-produce, high-technology fielded systems of today will be 
highly proliferated in the future.  These threat systems will likely be used for 
swarm attacks over the 40–50 year time span of this study.  This study made no 
attempt to conduct analysis on disruptive weapons technologies of the future.  
Those disruptive technologies will undoubtedly influence the battlespace; 
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however, they are less likely to proliferate in the time scope of this project.  
Anticipating and planning defensive systems for possible future disruptive 
weapons technologies is beyond the scope of this study.  Attacker characteristics 
are listed in Table 22. 








3. Asymptotic Variance 
Before developing the specifics of the experimental design for the entire 
factor space, a separate experiment was conducted to determine the asymptotic 
variance of the scenario.  Due to the complexity of the scenarios, it was important 
to conduct enough trials for each data point to ensure that the results are not 
skewed by extreme results.  In order to accomplish this, a single scenario was 
selected for examination.  150 trials were conducted to calculate the mean and 
variance of the casualties.  Table 23 summarizes the results of this experiment.  
Based on the results, at least 100 trials are required to ensure a constant 
variance.  It is assumed that the different data points or scenarios are sufficiently 




Threat Characteristics  ASCM  LSF  FAC/FIAC 
Number of Threats  60  60  60 
Speed of Threat (m/s)  1012  111  20.58 
Sensor Detection 
Range (m)  15000  15000  15000 
Sensor Detect 
Probability  1  1  1 
Weapon Range (m)  200  200  200 
Weapon PK  1  1  1 
Weapon  Firing  Rate 
(sec)  1  1  1 
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4. Design of Experiment 
The design of experiments had to be repeated a minimum of five times for 
the different possible attacker configurations (ie Smart LSF or Dumb FAC/FIAC, 
etc).  In order to ensure enough degrees of freedom that the second-order 
interactions could be examined, a half factorial was design was selected, 
creating 64 scenarios.  An additional ten center points were added for a basic 
design of 74 different scenarios.  In order to ensure that the variability of each 
scenario was represented, the basic design was repeated eleven times for a total 
of 814 scenarios for all five attacker configurations. 
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5. Measure of Effectiveness Selection 
The MOE for the DRM in question is the probability of survival of the HVU. 
The primary supporting Measures of Performance are the number of attackers 
killed by the HVU and TRUCCs, respectively.  This assumes that the threat 
systems have an effective Pk of 1; if they evade the HVU or TRUCC defenses, 
that the HVU will suffer a mission kill.  Each HVU has its own defensive 
capabilities; those range from robust layered defensive systems (such as DDGs) 
to no defensive equipment (such as Military Sealift Command vessels).  This 
wide range of defensive capabilities makes it impractical to derive DRM MOE 
directly.  The number of attackers killed by the TRUCC fleet is the measure of 
performance investigated in the model.  By assuming a defenseless HVU, the 
analysis will focus on TRUCC parameters, and avoid interdependencies caused 
by interactions with HVU targeting systems.  Operational level tactical 
considerations of cooperative engagement between manned and unmanned 
systems are left to further development.  As such, the primary analysis metric for 
Mission Effectiveness is the MOP “number of attackers killed by TRUCCs.” 
C. MODEL 1.0 FACTOR EXPLORATION RESULTS 
1. Analysis Approach  
Pareto charts were used in the JMP® software to establish an importance 
ranking among the explanatory variables.  This required a multiple variable 
regression prediction model.  A variable’s rank of importance does not 
necessarily secure its place in the prediction model; selection to the model 
depends on P-values and R-square marginal benefit.  The most important factors 























































































2. Prediction Model Analysis  
Multiple variable linear regression models were fitted to create predictions 
of the number of reds killed by blue defenders in each scenario.  The stepwise 
regression process performed by the JMP® software enters a single variable in 
each step according to its R-square value.  The variable with the highest 
marginal addition to the adjusted R-square value is selected as the next 
explanatory variable to enter the regression model.  As the number of variables 
used increases, the marginal “benefit” to the R-square value diminishes.  Due to 
this fact a boundary of 1.5% was established for the added marginal benefit. 
Once the margin was smaller, no more variables were selected for the model.  In 
addition a boundary of 0.25 was set for the P-values of each variable entering the 




order products of independent variables.  The prediction equations for each 
scenario in the half factorial experiments can be found under its corresponding 
section in Appendix B. 
D. MODEL 1.0 PROTOTYPE EVALUATION DESIGN 
In addition to the Model 1.0 Factor Exploration experiment, a second 
experiment was designed to evaluate the Small, Medium, and Large TRUCC 
designs created by the Mission Vehicle ship synthesis process.  The experiment 
differed from the factor exploration experiment because most of the factors, such 
as weapon ranges, sensor ranges, and TRUCC speed, were determined by the 
type of TRUCC being evaluated.  The specific design factors for the Small, 
Medium, and Large TRUCCs are summarized in Table 5.  The goal of the 
prototype evaluation model was to analyze the performance of the TRUCC 
network defense as the number of TRUCCs increased versus the same attacker 
configurations used in the Factor Exploration Experiment.  The design of 
experiments created a series of scenarios where configuration of the TRUCC 
remained constant as the number increased. 
It should be noted that the software limits of MANA prevented a complete 
evaluation of the Medium and Large TRUCC designs.  MANA only allows a 
maximum number of six weapons to be allocated to any agent.  This limit is 
below the proposed design for 7 and 18 small caliber weapons on Medium and 
Large TRUCCs respectively.  In order to complete the experiment, the number of 
weapons for each design was modeled as indicated in Table 25.   Since the 
maximum firepower was not available for these configurations, the experimental 
results for these configurations should be considered conservative.  It was also 
assumed that the Large TRUCC would have a performance at least as good as 
the Medium TRUCC against the Smart and Dumb FAC/FIAC threat since the 
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threats; however, there is a major difference between the number of Medium 
TRUCCs and Small TRUCCs for the Dumb LSF threat. In this scenario, the 
medium-caliber weapon of the Medium TRUCC is able to engage enough 
incoming Dumb LSFs that they do not overwhelm point defenses.  Interestingly, 
Small TRUCCs are overwhelmed by the Dumb LSF threat.  The near-
simultaneous arrival of Dumb LSFs, coupled with the short range, small-caliber 
weapons combined to generate a more stressing scenario than the Smart LSF 
threat.  Smart LSFs circle around the Small TRUCC defensive formation, and 
attack the HVU in small groups, or as singles, when opportunities present 
themselves. 
F. MODEL 1.1 DESIGN 
1. Importance of Delay 
A second design was created in order to explore the effects of a delay in 
the identification of the attacker.  This represents a scenario in which an attacker 
is detected, but positive hostile identification is delayed, potentially due to the 
need for interaction with a manned control station prior to weapons release 
authorization.  In Model 1.0, the TRUCCs could start firing at the attackers as 
soon as they were detected because classification occurred at the same time as 
detection.  That assumes that the unmanned system has the authority to classify 
an inbound track as hostile and open fire.  This assumption represents the least 
stressing case, because no time delay is generated by the need for human 
decision, or by communication delays.  In order to better understand the effects 
of that assumption a new experiment was designed and implemented.  The 
characteristics of the TRUCC and attackers were the same as in Model 1.0.  A 
delay of zero, five and ten seconds was implemented before the attackers were 
classified as enemies. 
2. Design of Experiments 
In order to examine all fifteen possible attacker/delay combinations a 
quarter-factorial experimental design using the seven TRUCC factors was 
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implemented.  This design resulted in 32 scenarios or data points for all fifteen 
combinations.  The blue forces referenced in the Pareto charts represent the 
TRUCC fleet. 
G. MODEL 1.1 RESULTS 
The following figures 61 through 75 are screen captures from JMP®, as 
such they were not edited to change the number of significant figures.  
Additionally the TRUCC fleet was modeled as the “blue” force, so the number of 
TRUCCs appears as the “number of blue” in the following Pareto charts. 
1. Dumb Missile Time Delay Results 
Figures 61, 62, and 63 are the Pareto charts for the Dumb Missile 
scenario with 0, 5, and 10 second delays. 
 
 
Figure 61.   Dumb ASCM 0 Second Delay 
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Figure 62.   Dumb ASCM 5 Second Delay 
 
Figure 63.   Dumb Missile 10 Second Delay 
A clear indication from the plots for Dumb ASCM scenarios is that sensor 
range becomes increasingly important as the classification delay increases.  With 
no delay, the TRUCCs can react immediately on the hostiles.  Due to this there is 
a significant tradeoff between sensor range and the human or machine agent’s 
ability to classify a threat.  Autonomous machines will have no advantage over 
human operators unless they are able to classify and act upon a threat faster 
than a human. 
2. Dumb LSF Time Delay Results 
Figures 64, 65, and 66 are the Pareto charts for the Dumb LSF scenario 
with 0, 5, and 10 second delays. 
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Figure 64.   Dumb LSF 0 Second Delay 
 
Figure 65.   Dumb LSF 5 Second Delay 
 
Figure 66.   Dumb LSF 10 Second Delay 
For the Dumb LSF case, time delays up to 10 seconds have no effect on 
the order of factor’s importance. This makes sense as the LSFs are much slower 
than the missile threat and therefore sensor range does not become an 
significant factor. Obviously, with longer delay durations (not evaluated here due 
to our estimation that 10 seconds is the maximum relevant delay) sensor range 
will become important, as with the missile case.    
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3. Smart LSF Time Delay Results 
Figures 67, 68, and 69 are the Pareto charts for the Dumb LSF scenario 
with 0, 5, and 10 second delays. 
 
Figure 67.   Smart LSF 0 Second Delay 
 
Figure 68.   Smart LSF 5 Second Delay 
 
Figure 69.   Smart LSF 10 Second Delay 
Adding delays in the Smart LSF scenarios has little effect upon the 
importance of the factors for the same reasons discussed in the Dumb LSF 
section. 
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4. Dumb FAC/FIAC Time Delay Results 
Figures 70, 71, and 72 are the Pareto charts for the Dumb LSF scenario 
with 0, 5, and 10 second delays. 
 
Figure 70.   Dumb FAC/FIAC 0 Second Delay 
 
Figure 71.   Dumb FAC/FIAC 5 Second Delay 
 
Figure 72.   Dumb FAC/FIAC 10 Second Delay 
 178
For the Dumb FAC/FIAC scenarios as delay increases sensor range 
becomes more important on the account of decreasing “number of blue” 
importance. The FAC/FIAC is the slowest moving threat compared to the 
missiles and LSFs. This is why the number of TRUCCs is important in the zero 
delay scenario, as the TRUCCs have sufficient time to make use of all defending 
forces, even with short weapon ranges. As the time delay grows, this factor is 
reduced in importance and the early warning given by a longer sensor range 
increases in importance.   
5. Smart FAC/FIAC Time Delay Results 
Figures 73, 74, and 75 are the Pareto charts for the Dumb LSF scenario 
with 0, 5, and 10 second delays. 
 
Figure 73.   Smart FAC/FIAC 0 Second Delay 
 
Figure 74.   Smart FAC/FIAC 5 Second Delay 
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Figure 75.   Smart FAC/FIAC 10 Second Delay 
In the smart FAC/FIAC scenario, as with the dumb FAC/FIAC scenario 
sensor range becomes more important with increasing delays. In this instance 
though, weapon range remains the most important factor as the delay increases.   
This is due to the maneuvers performed by the smart FAC/FIACs attempting to 
find a gap in the defenders. 
H. MODEL 1.2 DESIGN 
Model 1.2 is an experiment to examine the effects of scalability upon 
system performance.  The minimum force ratios identified in the prototype design 
evaluation experiment were used for this purpose (Table 32).  The force ratio 
between the TRUCCs and the attackers was held constant while the total 
number of actors was multiplied by two, three, and five.  Each of these scenarios 
was run 100 times and the average casualties for the attacker were recorded. 
Table 32.   Required Force Ratios 
 
Required Force Ratio
Threat Small Medium Large
Dumb Missle 0.5333 0.2333 0.05
Smart LSF 0.217 0.2 0.05
Dumb LSF 0.25 0.11667 0.05
Smart FAC/FIAC 0.1 0.05 0.05
Dumb FAC/FIAC 0.08333 0.05 0.05
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The specific number of Small, Medium, Large, and Attackers required for 
each threat and multiplier is summarized in Table 33. 
Table 33.   Scalability Experiment Force Strengths 
 
I. MODEL 1.2 RESULTS 
The red attack force was destroyed 100% of the time regardless of the 
multiplier used in every scenario.  From these results it is safe to conclude that 
the TRUCC system performance is approximately linear if the force ratio is held 
constant.  It is likely that due to the three-dimensional nature of the missile and 
LSF attacks that the required force ratios to ensure red destruction would 
Dumb Missile Number of Agents
Multplier Small  Medium Large Red
1 32 14 3 60
2 64 28 6 120
3 96 42 9 180
5 160 70 15 300
SMART LSF Number of Agents
Multplier Small  Medium Large Red
1 13 12 3 60
2 26 24 6 120
3 39 36 9 180
5 65 60 15 300
Dumb LSF Number of Agents
Multplier Small  Medium Large Red
1 15 7 3 60
2 30 14 6 120
3 45 21 9 180
5 75 35 15 300
Smart FAC/FIAC Number of Agents
Multplier Small  Medium Large Red
1 6 3 ‐ 60
2 12 6 ‐ 120
3 18 9 ‐ 180
5 30 15 ‐ 300
Dumb FAC/FIAC Number of Agents
Multplier Small  Medium Large Red
1 6 3 ‐ 60
2 12 6 ‐ 120
3 18 9 ‐ 180
5 30 15 ‐ 300
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decrease as more reds attacked since more targets would be available.  
Unfortunately MANA is a two-dimensional simulation and is unable to assist in 
investigating the effect any further. 
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XIII. OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY TECHNICAL COMPENDIUM 
Operational Availability as defined by OPNAVINST 3000.12A is the 
probability that the system will be ready to perform its specified function, in its 
specified and intended operational environment, when called for at a random 
point in time.  This definition of operational availability accurately reflects the real-
world operating environment and, therefore, is the preferred and most readily 
available means for which to formulate metrics that assess the quantitative 
performance of a given system. Further, the tools and models of operational 
availability provide a means to predict and assess system performance and 
readiness during deployment and operations/maintenance cycles.  More 
specifically, operational availability consists of a probability function that includes 
reliability, maintainability and supportability components: System Up Time 
divided by the Total Time, where Total Time represents two parameters, UP time 
and DOWN time. UP time is the time a system is operational between failures.  
DOWN time is the time the system is not operational.79  
Ao = System Up Time / Total Time (Up Time + Down Time).   
For this study, Ao also takes into account logistics time.  This inclusion of 
Ao in rests on the assumption that all parts required for repairs are deployed with 
the TRUCCs, thereby negating the effects of logistics down time inherent with the 
researching, ordering, and waiting for repair parts delivery. 
A. MODEL PURPOSE AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The purpose of the model was to simulate TRUCCs operating in a forward 
deployed and minimally manned location.  The model captured all of the 
elements concerning the operational availability of the TRUCCs including: 
amount of time to perform maintenance, amount of time to refuel each TRUCC,  
 
                                            
79 (United States Navy, 2011) 
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number of hours before routine maintenance must be performed, start-up 
operational availability of the TRUCCs, and endurance time or the time required 
for the TRUCCs to perform their mission.   
The term “maintenance” encompasses preventative and corrective 
maintenance.  Preventative maintenance includes, but is not limited to, periodic 
inspection, calibration, and scheduled replacement of fluids or components.80  
Corrective maintenance includes, but is not limited to, the emergent repair of 
failed systems or components.81  The model may account for these concepts in 
separate areas; however it satisfies the aforementioned definition of operational 
availability. 
The term start-up operational availability refers to the TRUCC’s ability to 
proceed onto mission from a standby status.  This term takes into account 
corrective maintenance, cannibalization of parts, delay times of diesel engine 
start-up, and any other maintenance being performed on the TRUCCs while in 
standby that was not completed in the maintenance area. 
The TRUCC must achieve an unprecedented level of reliability for 
maritime vehicles to support Combat Operations.  Unlike manned vessels, the 
TRUCC was not assumed to have dedicated onboard personnel to troubleshoot 
equipment problems, perform scheduled preventative maintenance, or make 
repairs to the system(s) while underway in a mission critical environment.   
Although unprecedented in the maritime domain, this high level of 
reliability is currently achieved in mature unmanned aerial vehicles.  For 
example, the Extended Range/Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aerial System (ER/MP 
UAS) regularly achieved an overall reliability greater than 0.9.82  Using the 
aforementioned examples, the TRUCC system was assumed to have achieved a 
                                            
80 (Operations, 2000, p. 154) 
81 (O'Rourke, 2008, p. 5) 
82 (General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, 2010) 
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reliability of no less than 0.95 including deployment, completing the mission, and 
returning to base.  This reliability assumption was chosen for illustrative purpose 
only.  Detail level design will determine the actual system reliability requirement. 
B. MODEL INPUTS AND OUTPUTS  
The inputs to the model were taken from the Mission Vehicle Group, via 
ship synthesis, and are:  
 Projected TRUCC endurance times plus variances. 
 Number of required TRUCCs on station to successfully fulfill a desired 
mission.  
These inputs generate the following outputs:  
 Number of TRUCCs required in inventory to fulfill the requisite number 
of TRUCCs on station. 
 Required Ao to support the TRUCC systems. 
C. OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY MODEL  
Using ExtendSim® 8.0 stochastic modeling software allowed for analysis 
of wide variations within the model.  For example, several functions within the 
model required different statistical distributions and the ExtendSim® software 
provided for manipulation of the inputs and outputs for these functions.  The 
software allowed us to vary the statistical distribution means and standard 
deviations in order to for us to capture the most realistic scenario for the DRM.  A 
functional flow block diagram of the ExtendSim® model is represented in Figure 
76 and discussed in detail in the following paragraphs.   
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Figure 76.   Functional Flow Block Diagram 
The ‘Model Start’ block is the beginning of the model.  The initial number 
of TRUCCs in inventory is read from an Excel®  database and imported into the 
model.  This block also starts the clock.   
The model then flows into the “TRUCC Run Times set to zero” block.  This 
block sets all of the TRUCC operating hours to zero and was done to represent 
and capture the need for planned maintenance accurately.  This block also 
simulates a new batch of TRUCCs arriving in theater and being placed into 
service. 
From here the newly arriving TRUCCs flow into the “TRUCCs enter 
Standby queue” block.  This block represents the TRUCCs in an operational 
standby configuration awaiting an assignment to proceed to mission.  TRUCCs 
enter the standby queue, (1) upon model initialization, (2) after maintenance or 
repair is conducted, or (3) after they have been refueled and remain in this queue 
until a need arises for them to proceed to a mission.   
From here the TRUCCs, in stand-by configuration, flow into the “TRUCCs 
to mission or repair” block.  This block represents the probability that a TRUCC 
will be operationally available after it has been placed in standby.  This block 
refers to the start-up operational availability of the TRUCCs.  The TRUCCs enter 
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this block and are either (1) found suitable to proceed to mission or (2) they are 
sent for repairs.  This process allows for consideration of additional variables 
related to unplanned maintenance, such as: 
 TRUCCs failure to start 
 Time required to heat up the lube oil 
 Time required to heat up the engine coolant 
 Time required to heat up the intake air 
 Time required to heat up the battery 
 Routine maintenance being accomplished pierside rather than in the 
maintenance bays83 
 Cannibalization of TRUCC parts to ensure enough TRUCCs are 
mission ready 
This block also simulates the start-up operational availability of the 
TRUCCs and accepts any combination of probability values so long as the total 
probability (probability of success and failure) adds to one. 
From here, the model flows into the “TRUCCs perform mission from given 
endurance” block for the TRUCCs that were suitable to proceed onto mission.  
This block represents the required number of TRUCCs out on mission for a given 
endurance time.  Given they are suitable to proceed from the previous block, 
they enter this block and perform their mission for the given endurance hours that 
are normally distributed with a standard deviation of 30 minutes.  This distribution 
allows for small variations in the (1) amount of time required to be out on mission, 
(2) the time required to transit to their station, and (3) to account for TRUCCs  
 
 
                                            
83 (United States Navy, 2005, p. 233) 
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being relieved at different times in order to maintain the required number of 
TRUCCs out on mission.  The endurance times are varied and are read from an 
Excel®  database and imported into the model. 
From here the model flows into the “Scheduled maintenance check” block.  
This block represents TRUCCs that are required to have preventative 
maintenance performed on one of their systems.  The model uses a fixed 
number of 1,500 hours for this block based on oil and oil filter replacement 
intervals for a diesel engine that does not have a dedicated onboard lube oil 
purifying system.84  Most of the information for engines was proprietary, forcing 
the use of analogous information readily available for diesel generators.  The 
assumption was made that once a TRUCC is out on mission, the diesel engine 
would operate mostly at a constant speed in order to conserve fuel, thus 
resembling how a generator is operated.  It was determined that this scheduled 
maintenance was the most common and allowed for other preventative 
maintenance to be performed concurrently.  When the TRUCCs enter this block, 
their operating hours are checked to determine the requirement for preventative 
maintenance.   
From here the model flows into the “TRUCCs to maintenance or refuel” 
block.  This block represents TRUCCs returning from a mission; they either 
proceed to preventative maintenance or are refueled.  If a TRUCC’s operating 
hours are greater than the specified number of hours required for preventative 
maintenance, it will be sent to a preventative maintenance queue.  Only the 
TRUCCs that were over the required number of hours were sent to maintenance, 
because the number of mission hours are small compared to the hours required 
to perform the maintenance.   
From here, TRUCCs not requiring preventative maintenance are routed 
into the “Refueling Time” block.  This block represents the refueling of TRUCCs 
                                            
84 (United States Navy, 2005, p. 233) 
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following a mission, simulated using a normal distribution with a mean of 45 
minutes and a standard deviation of 6 minutes; this distribution captures the 
minor differences associated with amounts of fuel dispensed and times required 
to transit to/from the refueling station.  The refueling time was based on basic 
ship synthesis analysis conducted by the Mission Vehicle Group.     
From here the model flows back into the “TRUCCs enter Standby queue” 
block.  The “Maintenance and Repair” block receives TRUCCs if repairs or 
preventative maintenance are required and represents the time required to 
perform (1) routine maintenance, (2) troubleshooting, and (3) conduct repairs on 
the TRUCCs.  Here, maintenance and repair actions are grouped into one term 
called “maintenance time”.  This block has the capacity to service a maximum of 
only five TRUCCs at any given time; this restriction captures the reality of a 
forward operating base with limited facilities and minimum manning in 
accordance with the DRM.   
The time to perform the maintenance or repairs is read into the model 
from an Excel®  database and utilizes a Poisson distribution with a varied 
expected value for each TRUCC.  A Poisson distribution was used in order to 
explore the impact of maintenance on the availability of the TRUCCs.  This 
distribution generated a range of discrete maintenance times required to perform 
the maintenance.  The Poisson distribution accounted for vast differences in the 
arrival and departure times to perform repairs and maintenance.  This distribution 
also takes into account that each occurrence for repair or maintenance is 
completely independent from the previous occurrence.  There are many different 
distributions that could have been chosen to model the maintenance times for the 
TRUCCs.  To validate the Poisson distribution, the group compared these 
outputs to log-normal and Weibul distributions for a limited number of 
simulations.  No significant difference was found in model output regardless of 
distribution chosen.  The discrete Poisson output performs similarly to other 
continuous distributions while allowing for slightly simplified analysis appropriate 
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From this block the model flows back into the “TRUCCs enter Standby 
queue” block.  The final block is the “Model End” block and is set to run for a 
specific number of hours before the model is complete.  Therefore, the simulation 
ends when the time limit is reached and one complete run is recorded.  If 
required, the simulation will restart. If not, the simulation ends. 
D. OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY MODEL SCREENING EXPERIMENT 
DESIGN 
Using JMP®, a design of experiments was conducted on the model input 
factors of endurance, refueling, and maintenance.  From this DOE, a randomized 
experiment was formulated using three factors, each with nine levels, resulting in 
a 9x9x9 factorial design randomized screening experiment, totaling 729 total 
runs, to determine which (if any) of the factors were significant.  The other input 
variables (reliability, number of hours for the model, number of TRUCCs that can 
be on mission, the number of TRUCCs that can be repaired or maintained at the 
same time, and the number of hours before routine maintenance) were held 
constant within the model.  The screening experiment used an assumed .8 start-
up operational availability factor, 5,000 hours for the run time, 30 TRUCCs 
required on mission, 5 TRUCCs repaired at a time, and 1,500 hours for routine 
maintenance. 
Table 34.   Statistical Distribution Table 
Statistical Distribution Table 
Factor  Distribution Type  Mean  Standard Deviation 
Endurance  Normal  Varied between TRUCC Variants  30 minutes 
Refueling  Normal  45 minutes  6 minutes 
Maintenance  Poisson  Varied between TRUCC Variants  ‐‐ 
 
The model received its endurance and refueling time inputs from the 




parameters listed in Table 34.  This allowed flexibility for transit times and 
connect/disconnect times during refueling.  These numbers were then varied for 
the three different sizes of TRUCCs and a range of both factors calculated.   
The times required to perform preventative maintenance and repairs were 
distributed between 10 to 90 hours using a Poisson distribution, and varied 
between the three sizes of TRUCCs.  This distribution allowed for consideration 
of occasional lengthy repairs.   
Maintenance Times were determined by taking into account minor 
adjustments to and potential replacement of essential systems due to 
catastrophic failure.  It is assumed that essential systems are more likely be 
replaced rather than repaired and in turn will shorten repair times.   
The requisite high level of reliability associated with the TRUCC mandates 
a tight bound on the distribution and is further supported using the assumption 
that each deploying TRUCC must be accompanied by its own replacement parts 
kit.  This kit must contain adequate replacement parts and special tools to sustain 
the system for the duration of its deployment.   Additionally, greater organization 
level (O-Level) maintenance will exist, compared to Intermediate (I-Level) 
maintenance or Depot (D-Level) maintenance, at forward deployed locations.  
These terms are widely used in the Naval Aviation Community.  Table 35 






Table 35.   Maintenance Description (from Navy Aviation Technical Publication 
14001-234) 
 
For the Medium- and Small- sized TRUCCs, factors of 0.67 and 0.1 
respectfully were applied to the maintenance times for the large variant due to 
the level of complexity decreasing and the ease of maintenance increasing as 












































Table 36.   Platform Operational Availability 85, 86, 87, 88, 89 
 
Research was conducted to determine the required level of start-up 
availability for the TRUCC and its supporting systems.  Technically specific data 
was either classified or proprietary; however, open-source documentation 
revealed the overall operational availability factors shown in Table 36 and 
represent useable unclassified data for DoD manned and unmanned systems; 
the most reliable systems were between 0.6 and 0.9.  There is no available data 
for start-up Ao, but the gathered data does give insight into and includes the 
start-up Ao.  Therefore, a value of 0.8 was used for illustration purpose only.  The 
actual operational requirement will be determined through detailed design 
studies.  The major takeaway of this section were obtained through the variation 
of the operational availability value used in the model.   
                                            
85 (Congressional Budget Office, 2007) 
86 (General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, 2010) 
87 (Baggett, Logistical Analysis of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Operating Independently in 
the Pacific, 2008, p. xvi) 
88 (Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, 2006, p. 273) 




















E. OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY MODEL SCREENING EXPERIMENT 
RESULTS 
The actual number of TRUCCs on mission was insignificant to model 
outputs, because the goal of the screening experiment was designed to assess 
the weight of the variables within the model.  Therefore, the assumption was 
made that the number of TRUCCs in inventory merely needed to support the 
number required for a mission and would subsequently translate into a force ratio 
for the various sizes of TRUCCs and their respective missions. 
A run-time of 5,000 hours was sufficient to stress the TRUCCs and forced 
them to require maintenance and allowed the model to successfully progress 
through a warm-up period and reach a steady state of operation.  Additionally, 
the long run time presented a viable opportunity to analyze any significant trends 
or factors that arose within the model 
Finally, refueling times had no significant impact on the model.  Once the 
models are refined, the refueling values will be held constant and only the 
maintenance and endurance times will be manipulated for further analysis.  It is 
important to note that the time to perform repairs, time to conduct 
troubleshooting, and time to perform planned maintenance were consolidated 
into one term labeled “maintenance time.” 
1. Large TRUCC 
The screening experiment revealed that 37 TRUCCs were required in 
inventory to achieve an average of 30.0 TRUCCs on mission.  It also revealed 
that supporting the Large TRUCC variants with endurances less than 22.6 hours 
and maintenance intervals above 40 hours required greater than 50 TRUCCs in 
inventory; this was deemed impractical because of the large number of TRUCCs 
required in inventory to accommodate such high maintenance times.  Table 37. 




depicts the number of TRUCCs required in inventory, the average maintenance 
times required to support them, and the minimum and maximum value 
combinations required to meet mission requirements. 
Table 37.   Maximum Allowable Maintenance Times for given Inventory, Large 
 
Maintenance times must average 40 hours or less for efficiency.  
Additionally, achieving 76-hour endurance required TRUCC inventories greater 
than 36.  An example of how to interpret Table 37 is by looking at the row with 40 
TRUCCs in inventory and following that row to the right.   
The average endurance hours observed was 55.8 hours with 11.4 hours 
of associated average maintenance.  The maximum and minimum combinations 
of endurance and maintenance time observed were 76 hours of endurance with 
20 hours of maintenance and 30.3 hours of endurance with 10 hours of 
maintenance respectively.  In summary, the number in inventory is the critical 
variable in achieving the overall endurance and maintenance times given a 
number of TRUCCs required for a specific mission. 
2. Medium TRUCC 
For the Medium TRUCC variant, 41 TRUCCS were required in inventory 
to achieve an average of 30.0 TRUCCs on mission. Once again, Table 38 only 







37 66.3 10 76 10 53.1 10
38 60.4 10 76 10 45.5 10
39 59.1 11.4 76 20 37.9 10
40 55.8 11.4 76 20 30.3 10
41 55.6 12.1 76 20 30.3 10
42 57.6 13 68.4 30 30.3 10
43 58.5 13 76 30 22.6 10
44 57.5 13.9 76 30 22.6 10
45 56.3 16.4 76 30 22.6 10
46 55.8 16.5 76 30 22.6 10
47 56.4 17.2 76 40 22.6 10
48 56.5 17.6 76 40 22.6 10
49 56.5 17.7 76 40 22.6 10






the number of TRUCCs required in inventory, the average maintenance times 
required to support them, and the minimum and maximum value combinations 
required to meet mission requirements. 
Table 38.   Maximum Allowable Maintenance Times for given Inventory, Medium 
 
Maintenance hours were capped at 40 hours or less in order to be 
efficient.  The Medium variant achieved a 75% increase in maximum endurance 
hours (from 76 to 133) across the board for all inventories greater than 41. 
The maximum and minimum combinations of endurance and maintenance 
time that were observed during the DOE were 133 hours of endurance with 59.4 
hours of maintenance 25 hours of endurance with 6.6 hours of maintenance 
respectively.  Again, the number in inventory is the critical variable to achieving 
the desired endurance and maintenance times for a requisite mission. 
3. Small TRUCC 
The number of Small TRUCCs required in inventory to achieve an 
average of 30.0 TRUCCs on mission was 35.  Again, Table 39 only considers 
TRUCC variants that meet the required 30.0 average and depicts the number of 
TRUCCs required in inventory, the average maintenance times required to 
support them, and the minimum and maximum value combinations required to 







41 90.4 7.9 133 13.2 52 6.6
42 88.3 12.5 133 39.6 25 6.6
43 90.2 15.6 133 46.2 25 6.6
44 94 20.2 133 59.4 25 6.6
45 94.8 22.7 133 59.4 25 6.6
46 94.3 23.5 133 59.4 25 6.6
47 94.3 24.6 133 59.4 25 6.6
48 93.9 25.5 133 59.4 25 6.6
49 93.9 26.2 133 59.4 25 6.6






Table 39.   Maximum Allowable Maintenance Times for given Inventory, Small 
 
For this variant, maintenance must average 9 hours or less for efficiency.  
Also, 24-hour endurance was achievable for all TRUCC inventories greater than 
37.  The maximum and minimum combinations of endurance and maintenance 
time that were observed were 24 hours of endurance with 5 hours of 
maintenance and 9 hours of endurance with 1 hour of maintenance respectively.  
Again, the number in inventory was critical to achieving the desired number of 
operational vessels. 
F. REFINED DOE MODEL 
 After analyzing the data extracted from the screening experiment, 
the maintenance times for the model were refined for the three TRUCC size 
variants.  A customized one factor DOE with 81 levels was generated using 1x81 
factorial design randomized for the refinement experiment; only maintenance 
times varied.  The goal for the refinement was to determine the number of 
TRUCCs required for each variant given a specific threat.   
The following variables were held constant due to the focused interest in 
the number of overall TRUCCs required in inventory with a constant start-up 







35 21.3 1 22.2 1 20.3 1
36 19.7 1.1 24 2 16.5 1
37 18 1.3 24 2 14.6 1
38 18.63 1.65 24 3 14.6 1
39 18.5 1.9 24 4 12.8 1
40 18.1 2.2 24 5 9 1
41 17.9 2.8 24 6 9 1
42 17.9 3.3 24 7 9 1
43 18 3.7 24 8 9 1
44 18 4 24 9 9 1
45 17.9 4 24 9 9 1
46 17.8 4.3 24 9 9 1
47 17.8 4.4 24 9 9 1
48 17.7 4.4 24 9 9 1
49 17.7 4.4 24 9 9 1






model, number of TRUCCs that can be on mission, the number of TRUCCs that 
can be repaired or maintained at the same time, the refueling times for each 
variant, the endurance times for each variant, and the number of hours before 
routine maintenance.  This DOE was run with an assumed 45 minute refueling 
time, 5,000 hours run time, a 5 TRUCC cap on the number of vessels under 
repair, 0.8 start-up operational availability, and 1,500 hours for routine 
maintenance.90   
1. Large TRUCC for Low Slow Flyer, FAC/FIAC, and Cruise 
Missile threats 
The refined experiment showed that the minimum number of TRUCCs 
required in inventory to achieve an average of 3.0 TRUCCs on mission was four.  
To maintain consistency with the baseline model, Table 40 considers only the 
TRUCC variants that meet the required 3.0 average and depicts the number of 
TRUCCs required in inventory, the average maintenance times required 
supporting them, and the minimum and maximum value combinations required to 
meet mission requirements. 
Table 40.   TRUCC Endurance and Maintenance 
 
As depicted, Table 40 maintenance times averaged 25 hours or less and 
averaged 12 hours for the worst-case scenario of only one spare TRUCC in 
inventory.  Increasing the number of TRUCCs in inventory by two drastically 
increased the allowable mean maintenance time from 17.5 to 40 hours.   
With five TRUCCs in inventory, the average endurance was 88.1 hours 
with an average maintenance time of 23.7 hours.  The maximum and minimum 
                                            







4 88.1 12 88.1 17.5 88.1 10
5 88.1 23.7 88.1 40 88.1 10






combinations of endurance and maintenance time were 88.1 hours of endurance 
with 40 hours of maintenance and 88.1 hours of endurance with 10 hours of 
maintenance respectively.  Again, the number of TRUCCs in inventory affects 
how much maintenance time can be afforded to the TRUCCs and vice versa. 
A linear regression analysis was then performed on the data output from 
the model to derive endurance times and the number of TRUCCs required on 
mission.  Due to time constraints, the model was run only until the data met the 
required number of TRUCCs on station and the maximum maintenance time was 
observed.  The derived equation does provide strong insight into the relationship 
between the number of TRUCCs required in inventory given and average 
maintenance times.   
The results were an achieved R squared value of 0.82 with a p-value for 
the average maintenance time of 0.275 (slightly higher than the accepted criteria 
of 0.20).  Since, the p-value is higher than 0.20 it shows that the data for 
maintenance times may not be statistically significant in determining the number 




Figure 78.   Regression Output 
The derived equation is: 
 2.434 .127InventoryofTRUCCs AvgMainTime    
This equation yields the number of TRUCCs required in inventory for a given 
scenario with given threats.  The team recommends further analysis to yield a 
more robust equation. 
2. Analysis of Large TRUCCs 
Following data collection, TRUCCs were grouped by numbers required in 
inventory, TRUCCs required on mission, and the average maintenance time 
factors.  A similar regression analysis was conducted to determine the number of 
TRUCCs required in inventory.  The analysis achieved an R squared value of 1.0 
with undetermined p-values for the number of TRUCCs required on mission and 
the average maintenance time.  The data used (see Table 41) and the regression 









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 1.648 1.648 4.688 0.275
Residual 1 0.352 0.352
Total 2 2
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 2.434 1.233 1.974 0.299 ‐13.238 18.107
Average Maintenance Time (hrs) 0.127 0.059 2.165 0.275 ‐0.617 0.871
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Table 41.   Required TRUCCs based on Maintenance Time 
 
 
Figure 79.   Regression Output 
These errors were the result of both insufficient data and forcing the 
number of TRUCCs to a specific value.  The minimum number of TRUCCs 
required to defend against all threats was 3.  This resulted in no variation 
resulting in an R Square value of 1.0.  These factors alone cannot be used to 
determine the amount of large TRUCCs required in inventory.  Further analysis is 
required to analyze the large TRUCC variant in different DRMs in order to gather 
more data. 
3. Medium TRUCC for FAC/FIAC Threat 
The minimum number of TRUCCs required in inventory to achieve an 


















df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 2 1 #NUM! #NUM!
Residual 0 0 65535
Total 2 2
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 2.434 0 65535 #NUM! 2.434 2.434
TRUCCs Required 0.000 0 65535 #NUM! 0.000 0.000
Average Maintenance Time (hrs) 0.127 0 65535 #NUM! 0.127 0.127
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required 3.0 average TRUCCs in inventory, the average maintenance times 
required to support them, and minimum and maximum value combinations that 
could be used in order to meet the requirements. 
Table 42.   Medium TRUCC Maintenance Values 
 
As depicted in Table 42, maintenance times averaged 32.1 hours or less 
and averaged 11.2 hours for the worst-case scenario of only one spare TRUCC 
in inventory.  Adding two extra TRUCCs to the inventory drastically increased the 
mean maintenance time from 11.2 to 29.1 hours.  The maximum combination 
was 99.8 hours of endurance with 59.6 hours of maintenance and the minimum 
combination was 99.8 hours of endurance with 6.6 hours of maintenance.   
A regression analysis was performed on the data using the derived 
endurance time and the derived number of TRUCCs required on mission.  As for 
previous variants, the model was run only until the data met the required number 
of TRUCCs on station and the maximum maintenance time was observed.  
Subsequently, because only three data points for TRUCCs in inventory and the 
average maintenance time was collected the regression offers basic insights but 
could be improved with additional DRM data points.  This regression provides 
insight into the number of TRUCCs required in inventory given an average 
maintenance time.  With an R-squared value of .86 and a p-value for the average 
maintenance of .249 (slightly higher than the accepted .20), the output from the 







4 99.8 11.2 99.8 19.9 99.8 6.6
5 99.8 29.1 99.8 59.6 99.8 6.6







Figure 80.   Medium TRUCC Regression Output 
The derived equation is: 
 3.025 .0818InventoryofTRUCCs AvgMainTime    
This equation yields the number of TRUCCs required in inventory for a given 
scenario with given threats.  It is the team’s recommendation that additional data 
be collected to yield a more robust equation. 
4. Medium TRUCC for Dumb LSF Threat 
The minimum number of TRUCCs required in inventory to achieve an 
average of 7.0 TRUCCs on mission was 10.  Table 43 considers only the 
required 7.0 average TRUCCs in inventory, the average maintenance times 
required to support them, and minimum and maximum value combinations that 









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 1.710 1.710 5.903 0.249
Residual 1 0.290 0.290
Total 2 2
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 3.0252 0.8702 3.4763 0.1783 ‐8.0322 14.0825
Average Maintenance Time (hrs) 0.0818 0.0337 2.4295 0.2486 ‐0.3461 0.5098
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Table 43.   Medium TRUCC Maintenance Values 
 
As depicted in Table 43, maintenance times averaged 32.4 hours or less 
and averaged 16.2 hours for the worst case scenario of only 3 spare TRUCCs in 
inventory.  By adding two TRUCCs to inventory the allowable mean maintenance 
time drastically increased from 16.2 to 31.6 hours.  The maximum combination 
was 99.8 hours of endurance with 39.7 hours of maintenance and the minimum 
combination was 99.8 hours of endurance with 6.6 hours of maintenance.  
A regression analysis was performed on the data using the derived 
endurance time and the derived number of TRUCCs required on mission.  As for 
previous variants, the model was only run until the data met the required number 
of TRUCCs on station and the maximum maintenance time was observed.  The 
analysis achieved an R squared value of 0.91, but the p-value for the average 
maintenance time was 0.045.  Since, the p-value is lower than 0.05 it shows that 
maintenance time is statistically significant in determining the number of 








10 99.8 16.2 99.8 39.7 99.8 6.6
11 99.8 20.5 99.8 39.7 99.8 6.6
12 99.8 31.6 99.8 59.6 99.8 6.6







Figure 81.   Medium TRUCC Regression Output 
The derived equation is: 
 7.664 .152InventoryofTRUCCs AvgMainTime    
This equation yields the number of TRUCCs required in inventory for a given 
scenario with given threats.  
5. Medium TRUCC for Smart LSF Threat 
The minimum number of TRUCCs required in inventory to achieve an 
average of 12.0 TRUCCs on mission was 17.  Table 44 only considers the 
required 12.0 average TRUCCs in inventory, the average maintenance times 
required to support them, and minimum and maximum value combinations that 









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 4.549 4.549 20.155 0.046
Residual 2 0.451 0.226
Total 3 5
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 7.664 0.887 8.641 0.013 3.848 11.480
Average Maintenance Time (hrs) 0.152 0.034 4.489 0.046 0.006 0.298
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Table 44.   Maintenance Values for Medium TRUCC 
 
As depicted in Table 44, maintenance times averaged 32.4 hours or less 
and averaged 9.2 hours for the worst-case scenario of only 5 spare TRUCCs in 
inventory. By adding seven extra TRUCCs to inventory, the allowable mean 
maintenance time drastically increased from 9.2 to 30.4 hours.  The maximum 
combination was 99.8 hours of endurance with 59.6 hours of maintenance and 
the minimum combination was 99.8 hours of endurance with 6.6 hours of 
maintenance.   
A regression analysis was performed on the data using the derived 
endurance time and the derived number of TRUCCs required on mission.  As for 
previous variants, the model was only run until the data met the required number 
of TRUCCs on station and the maximum maintenance time was observed. This 
model achieved an R-squared value of .94 and a p-value of .032. The output 







17 99.8 9.2 99.8 13.2 99.8 6.6
18 99.8 19.7 99.8 33.1 99.8 6.6
19 99.8 30.4 99.8 59.6 99.8 6.6







Figure 82.   Medium TRUCC Regression Output 
The derived equation is: 
 15.83 .117InventoryofTRUCCs AvgMainTime    
This equation yields the number of TRUCCs required in inventory for a given 
scenario with given threats.  
6. Medium TRUCC for ASCM Threat 
The minimum number of TRUCCs required in inventory to achieve an 
average of 14.0 TRUCCs on mission was 20.  Table 45 only considers the 
required 14.0 average TRUCCs in inventory, the average maintenance times 
required to support them, and minimum and maximum value combinations that 









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 4.680 4.680 29.279 0.032
Residual 2 0.320 0.160
Total 3 5
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 15.828 0.533 29.706 0.00113 13.535 18.120
Average Maintenance Time (hrs) 0.117 0.022 5.411 0.032 0.024 0.209
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Table 45.   Medium TRUCC Maintenance Values 
 
As depicted in Table 45, maintenance times averaged 32.1 hours or less 
and averaged 8.6 hours for the worst case scenario of only 6 spare TRUCCs in 
inventory. By adding seven extra TRUCCs to inventory, the allowable mean 
maintenance time drastically increased from 8.6 to 20.9 hours.  The maximum 
combination was 99.8 hours of endurance with 39.7 hours of maintenance and 
the minimum combination was 99.8 hours of endurance with 6.6 hours of 
maintenance.   
A regression analysis was performed on the data using the derived 
endurance time and the derived number of TRUCCs required on mission.  As for 
previous variants, the model was only run until the data met the required number 
of TRUCCs on station and the maximum maintenance time was observed. This 
model achieved an R-squared value of 0.95 and a p-value of 0.023. The output 







20 99.8 8.6 99.8 13.2 99.8 6.6
21 99.8 20.9 99.8 39.7 99.8 6.6
22 99.8 24.7 99.8 46.4 99.8 6.6







Figure 83.   Medium TRUCC Regression Output 
The derived equation is: 
 18.73 .1284InventoryofTRUCCs AvgMainTime    
This equation yields the number of TRUCCs required in inventory for a given 
scenario with given threats.  
7. Analysis of Medium TRUCCs 
Following data collection, Medium TRUCCs were grouped by numbers 
required in inventory, TRUCCs required on mission, and the average 
maintenance time factors.  A similar regression analysis was conducted to 
determine the number of TRUCCs required in inventory.  The analysis achieved 
an R squared value of 0.996 with acceptable p-values for the number of TRUCCs 
required on mission and the average maintenance time.  The data used and the 









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 4.770 4.770 41.436 0.023
Residual 2 0.230 0.115
Total 3 5
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 18.730 0.463 40.492 0.000609 16.740 20.720
Average Maintenance Time (hrs) 0.128 0.020 6.437 0.0233 0.0426 0.2142
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Table 46.   Average Maintenance Time 
 
 
































df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 580.796 290.398 1630.759 2.427E‐15
Residual 12 2.137 0.178
Total 14 582.933
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept ‐2.280 0.427 ‐5.337 0.000177 ‐3.211 ‐1.349
TRUCCs Required 1.514 0.027 57.077 5.520E‐16 1.456 1.571
Average Maintenance Time (hrs) 0.119 0.013 9.332 7.521E‐07 0.091 0.147
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The derived equation from the analysis is:
  2.28 1.51 .119InventoryofTRUCCs NumberofTRUCCsRequired AvgMainTime     
This equation yields the number of TRUCCs required in inventory for a given 
scenario with given threats. 
8. Small TRUCC for FAC/FIAC Threat 
The minimum number of Small TRUCCs required in inventory to achieve 
an average of 6.0 TRUCCs on mission was 11.  Table 47 only considers the 
required 6.0 average TRUCCs in inventory, the average maintenance times 
required to support them, and minimum and maximum value combinations that 
could be used in order to meet the requirements. 
Table 47.   Maintenance Values for Medium TRUCCs 
 
As depicted in Table 47, maintenance times averaged 3.9 hours or less 
and averaged 1 hour for the worst-case scenario of only 5 spare TRUCCs in 
inventory.  The data reveals that having a mean maintenance time of greater 
than 7 hours is not feasible without adding 10 additional TRUCCs to inventory. 
The results also depict that having more than 16 TRUCCs in inventory 
contributes little added significance.  The maximum combination was 3.8 hours of 
endurance with 7 hours of maintenance and the minimum combination was 3.8 
hours of endurance with 1 hour of maintenance.   
A regression analysis was performed on the data using the derived 
endurance time and the derived number of TRUCCs required on mission.  As for 







11 3.8 1 3.8 1 3.8 1
12 3.8 1.4 3.8 2 3.8 1
13 3.8 2.3 3.8 4 3.8 1
14 3.8 2.8 3.8 5 3.8 1
15 3.8 3.6 3.8 7 3.8 1






of TRUCCs on station and the maximum maintenance time was observed. This 
model achieved an R-squared value of 0.99 and a p-value of near zero. The 
output from the regression is shown in Figure 85: 
 
Figure 85.   Medium TRUCC Regression Output 
The derived equation is: 
 9.51 1.598InventoryofTRUCCs AvgMainTime    
This equation yields the number of TRUCCs required in inventory for a given 
scenario with given threats.  
9. Small TRUCC for Dumb LSF Threat 
The minimum number of Small TRUCCs required in inventory to achieve 
an average of 15.0 TRUCCs on mission was 25.  Table 48 only considers the 
required 15.0 average TRUCCs in inventory, the average maintenance times 
required to support them, and minimum and maximum value combinations that 









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 17.254 17.254 281.060 0.000
Residual 4 0.246 0.061
Total 5 17.5
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 9.506 0.259 36.727 0.000 8.787 10.225
Average Maintenance Time (hrs) 1.598 0.095 16.765 0.000 1.333 1.862
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Table 48.   Small TRUCC Maintenance Values 
 
As depicted Table 48, maintenance times averaged 2 hours or less and 
averaged 1 hour for the worst-case scenario of only 10 spare TRUCCs in 
inventory.  The data reveals that having a mean maintenance time of greater 
than 3 hours is not feasible without an additional 15 TRUCCs on station.  The 
results also depict that having more than 28 TRUCCs in inventory contributes 
little added significance. The maximum combination was 3.8 hours of endurance 
with 2 hours of maintenance and the minimum combination was 3.8 hours of 
endurance with 1 hour of maintenance.   
A regression analysis was performed on the data using the derived 
endurance time and the derived number of TRUCCs required on mission.  As for 
previous variants, the model was only run until the data met the required number 
of TRUCCs on station and the maximum maintenance time was observed. This 
model achieved an R-squared value of 0.98 and a p-value of near zero. The 







25 3.8 1 3.8 1 3.8 1
26 3.8 1.3 3.8 2 3.8 1
27 3.8 1.5 3.8 2 3.8 1
28 3.8 1.6 3.8 3 3.8 1
29 3.8 1.8 3.8 3 3.8 1







Figure 86.   Small TRUCC Regression Output 
The derived equation is: 
 19.51 5.21InventoryofTRUCCs AvgMainTime    
This equation yields the number of TRUCCs required in inventory for a given 
scenario with given threats, with an 98% chance that the number given will fall 
within a 95% confidence interval. 
10. Small TRUCC for Smart LSF Threat 
The minimum number of Small TRUCCs required in inventory to achieve 
an average of 13.0 TRUCCs on mission was 22.  Table 49 only considers the 
required 13.0 average TRUCCs in inventory, the average maintenance times 
required to support them, and minimum and maximum value combinations that 









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 17.195 17.195 225.310 0.000115
Residual 4 0.305 0.076
Total 5 17.5
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 19.511 0.544 35.860 3.610E‐06 18.000 21.021
Average Maintenance Time (hrs) 5.211 0.347 15.010 0.000115 4.247 6.174
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Table 49.   Small TRUCC Maintenance Values 
 
As depicted Table 49, maintenance times averaged 2 hours or less and 
averaged 1 hour for the worst case scenario of only 9 spare TRUCCs in 
inventory.  The data reveals that having a mean maintenance time of greater 
than 7 hours is not feasible without adding 14 additional TRUCCs on station. The 
results also depict that having more than 25 TRUCCs in inventory contributes 
little added significance. The maximum combination was 3.8 hours of endurance 
with 4 hours of maintenance and the minimum combination was 3.8 hours of 
endurance with 1 hour of maintenance 
A regression analysis was performed on the data using the derived 
endurance time and the derived number of TRUCCs required on mission.  As for 
previous variants, the model was only run until the data met the required number 
of TRUCCs on station and the maximum maintenance time was observed. This 
model achieved an R-squared value of 0.94 and a p-value of 0.0015. The output 







22 3.8 1 3.8 1 3.8 1
23 3.8 1.4 3.8 2 3.8 1
24 3.8 1.5 3.8 2 3.8 1
25 3.8 1.8 3.8 3 3.8 1
26 3.8 2 3.8 3 3.8 1







Figure 87.   Small TRUCC Regression Output 
The derived equation is: 
 17.03 4.62InventoryofTRUCCs AvgMainTime    
This equation yields the number of TRUCCs required in inventory for a given 
scenario with given threats.  
11. Small TRUCC for ASCM Threat 
The minimum number of Small TRUCCs required in inventory to achieve 
an average of 32.0 TRUCCs on mission was 49.  Table 50 only considers the 
required 32.0 average TRUCCs in inventory, the average maintenance times 
required to support them, and minimum and maximum value combinations that 









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 16.402 16.402 59.775 0.00151
Residual 4 1.098 0.274
Total 5 17.5
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 17.030 0.990 17.211 6.687E‐05 14.283 19.778
Average Maintenance Time (hrs) 4.620 0.598 7.731 0.00151 2.961 6.280
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Table 50.   Small TRUCC Maintenance Values 
 
As depicted Table 50, maintenance times averaged 1 hour for all TRUCC 
inventory levels.  The data reveals that having a mean maintenance time of 
greater than one hour is not feasible without adding 22 additional TRUCCs on 
station. The results also depict that having more than 49 TRUCCs in inventory 
contributes little added significance. The maximum combination was 3.8 hours of 
endurance with one hour of maintenance and the minimum combination was 3.8 
hours of endurance with one hour of maintenance 
12. Analysis of Small TRUCCs 
Following data collection, Small TRUCCs were grouped by numbers 
required in inventory, TRUCCs required on mission, and the average 
maintenance time factors.  A similar regression analysis was conducted to 
determine the number of TRUCCs required in inventory.  The analysis achieved 
an R squared value of 0.99 with acceptable p-values for the number of TRUCCs 
required on mission and the average maintenance time.  The data used (see 







49 3.8 1 3.8 1 3.8 1
50 3.8 1 3.8 1 3.8 1
51 3.8 1 3.8 1 3.8 1
52 3.8 1 3.8 1 3.8 1
53 3.8 1 3.8 1 3.8 1
54 3.8 1 3.8 1 3.8 1










































Figure 88.   Regression Output 
The derived equation from the analysis is: 
  .852 1.557 1.699InventoryofTRUCCs NumberofTRUCCsRequired AvgMainTime     
This equation yields the number of TRUCCs required in inventory for a given 
scenario with given threats.  
G. ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY ON 
THE TRUCCS 
As previously stated, the critical assumption is that the TRUCCs deploy 
with a total system reliability of 0.95.  Since reliability is less than 1, the 0.05 
probability (1–0.95) that the system will fail must be accounted for; therefore, a 
binomial probability calculation was performed on each TRUCC variant for each 
mission.  A binomial distribution was used in order to ensure that each TRUCC 
was treated independently.  The equation used to calculate the TRUCCs 









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 5263.200 2631.600 1036.798 0.000
Residual 22 55.840 2.538
Total 24 5319.04
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.852 1.449 0.588 0.562 ‐2.153 3.858
TRUCCs Required 1.556 0.042 37.343 2.149E‐21 1.470 1.643
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TRUCCs required is 32 and continues to be significant up until there are four 
spares.  One important takeaway from this data is that it shows that the benefit of 
spares begins to decrease between the requirement for 15–32 TRUCCs. 
H. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Start-up operational availability of the TRUCCs was fixed at 0.8 and only 
effects of maintenance and repairs investigated.  A subsequent sensitivity 
analysis conducted on the operational availability for the TRUCCs prior to 
heading out on mission revealed operational availability ranges between 0.6 and 
.9 for the scenario of medium TRUCCs versus a smart LSF.  Table 55 shows the 
results.  










0.9 15 99.8 6.6 99.8 6.6 99.8 6.6
0.9 16 99.8 23 99.8 46.4 99.8 6.6
0.9 17 99.8 32.1 99.8 59.6 99.8 6.6
0.9 18 99.8 32.8 99.8 59.6 99.8 6.6
0.8 17 99.8 9.2 99.8 13.2 99.8 6.6
0.8 18 99.8 19.7 99.8 33.1 99.8 6.6
0.8 19 99.8 30.4 99.8 59.6 99.8 6.6
0.8 20 99.8 32.4 99.8 59.6 99.8 6.6
0.7 19 99.8 6.6 99.8 6.6 99.8 6.6
0.7 20 99.8 9 99.8 13.2 99.8 6.6
0.7 21 99.8 19.1 99.8 39.7 99.8 6.6
0.7 22 99.8 23 99.8 46.4 99.8 6.6
0.7 23 99.8 29.1 99.8 59.6 99.8 6.6
0.6 21 99.8 6.6 99.8 6.6 99.8 6.6
0.6 22 99.8 8.5 99.8 13.2 99.8 6.6
0.6 23 99.8 11.2 99.8 19.9 99.8 6.6
0.6 24 99.8 12 99.8 19.9 99.8 6.6
0.6 25 99.8 14.3 99.8 26.5 99.8 6.6
0.6 26 99.8 20.3 99.8 46.4 99.8 6.6
0.6 27 99.8 22.8 99.8 46.4 99.8 6.6
0.6 28 99.8 23.5 99.8 53 99.8 6.6
0.6 29 99.8 25.7 99.8 53 99.8 6.6
0.6 30 99.8 25.9 99.8 53 99.8 6.6
0.6 31 99.8 27.7 99.8 59.6 99.8 6.6
0.6 32 99.8 28.3 99.8 59.6 99.8 6.6
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A regression analysis was conducted on the data collected to determine 
the weight of influence of Ao had in determining the number of TRUCCs required 
in inventory.  The regression analysis took into account 26 data points for 
average maintenance time, operational availability, and the number of TRUCCs 
required in inventory.  Achieving an R squared value of 0.88 with p-values for Ao 
and average maintenance time essentially zero shows that the data for 
maintenance times and Ao are important in determining the number of TRUCCs 
required in inventory.  The output from the regression is shown in Figure 94: 
 
Figure 94.   TRUCC Regression Output 
The derived equation is
 45.77 40.77 (.272 )InventoryofTRUCCs OpAvail AvgMainTime     .  This equation 
yields the number of TRUCCs required in inventory for a given scenario with 










df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 599.364 299.682 85.643 2.2019E‐11
Residual 23 80.482 3.499
Total 25 679.846
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P‐value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 45.771 2.342 19.545 7.980E‐16 40.927 50.616
Operational Availability ‐40.771 3.309 ‐12.322 1.300E‐11 ‐47.616 ‐33.927
Average Maintenance Time (hrs) 0.272 0.042 6.487 1.281E‐06 0.185 0.359
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J. CONCLUSION 
Considering the aforementioned assumptions, the analysis yielded several 
conclusions.  First, the average maintenance times have a significant effect on 
the number of TRUCCs required in inventory; maintenance times increased as 
the number of TRUCCs increased.  A Poisson distribution represents the 
variations of the time to perform maintenance for this initial look at TRUCC 
maintenance.  Detail-level design and specification will lead to a more thorough 
examination of the most appropriate distribution and mean maintenance time for 
the given system-of-systems, allowing a more precise analysis.  Second, the 
number of TRUCCs required in inventory and the amount of time required for 
maintenance is greatly influenced by the level of Ao achieved; the number of 
TRUCCs required increased and it became increasingly difficult to accommodate 
long maintenance times as Ao decreased. 
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XIV. MISSION VEHICLE TECHNICAL COMPENDIUM 
The Mission Vehicle sub-group was tasked with creating a vehicle for the 
mission based on the capabilities required to successfully complete the mission.  
Using the ship synthesis method and validating the approach using basic naval 
architecture principles, the purpose was to balance the design in an engineering 
perspective and calculate objective attributes for a given set of design variable 
values.  Ship synthesis is essentially a technique to allow the development of a 
ship definition with the limited data available at the early stage of design92. The 
goal of the model was to use fixed mission parameters such as speed, total 
displacement, and type of hull and return capabilities and figures that were useful 
to other groups for further analysis.  The group considered a monohull due to the 
vast ships in existence using this hull form, low technological risk, suitability in 
the littoral environment, and low speed requirement based on early screening 
experiments.  
A. INPUTS AND OUTPUTS 
A functional decomposition was the first step in assessing what the model 
was supposed to do.  This led to a list of inputs and outputs.  These outputs were 
used to derive the necessary inputs; starting with the desired outputs was a 
logical step since the Mission Vehicle group served as an integration point to the 
other groups’ models.  Once the complete list of outputs was clearly understood, 
the group began investigating the primary and secondary inputs feeding the 
outputs.  Various specific algorithms process inputs and generate outputs using 
regression and ship synthesis principles.   
  
                                            
92 (Choi, 2009, p. 14) 
 230
During the process of investigating inputs and outputs, the model was 




This simplified the research and developmental processes of deriving 
algorithms necessary to achieve the desired outputs.  These three categories 
were naturally grouped to the outputs of our model.  This is important because it 
becomes apparent that the discipline of Naval Architecture is complex. Due to 
this complexity, it is necessary to stress that this analysis is a first-order ship 
synthesis study.  Additional detailed naval architecture design is necessary to 
refine these initial designs.   
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
Within this study there are three categories of vessels. These categories 
constrain dimensional and pragmatic constraints and vary from one to the next; 
small, medium, and large. While conducting initial ship synthesis we discovered 
these relationships and correlations when transitioning between thresholds of 
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and gas turbine engines were calculated.93  Although the use of gas turbine 
engines surfaced during the research, they were typically on larger vessels and 
therefore discarded from further consideration.   
The fuel weight of a vessel is a function of the design draft.  The relationship 
is not linear and changes drastically with draft.  An exponential curve to fit the 
data was determined using gathered fuel capacity-to-weight ratios from Jane’s 
Fighting Ships.  The required Horsepower (HP) is a function of displacement, 
speed and length of vessel.  A simple regression analysis was conducted to 
establish an equation to estimate HP using information gathered from Jane’s 
fighting ships. 
The number of small and medium caliber weapons is a function of 
displacement, speed, and length of vessel.  The length to beam ratio is a function 
of displacement, speed, and length of vessel.  The beam to draft ratio is a 
function of displacement, speed, and length of vessel.  The fuel intake rates are a 
function of displacement, speed, and length of vessel. 
The missile systems are best utilized on large ship due to weight and 
dimension requirements.  Rolling Airframe Missiles (RAM) and Evolved Sea 
Sparrow Missiles (ESSM) are two missile system choices for large vessels. 
These are representative systems.  The radar range equation determines the 
sensor range as a function of ship size.94  
C. SHIP SYNTHESIS MODEL 
1. Weapons 
To derive the weapons characteristics of the vehicle, the current weapons 
paradigm for manned vessels was examined for vessels ranging in lengths from 
7 to 200 feet.  This revealed that weapons systems could be divided into three 
different types: small caliber weapons, medium caliber weapons and missiles.  In 
                                            
93 (Dalakos, 2011) 
94 (Harney, Combat Systems Vol. 2, 2005, p. 155) 
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terms of capability, these terms translate to Low Mass, Low Pk (Small caliber), 
Medium Mass, Low Pk (Medium), Large Mass, High Pk (Missile). 
a. Small caliber – Using historical systems to derive the amount of small 
caliber weapons to place onboard yielded the following ratio of 
weapons to length:  for every 12.7 feet of length, there will be 1 small 
caliber weapon, see table 1.  The representative weapons system for 
small caliber munitions was the GAU-19 machine gun.  This is 
depicted in Table 56. 
Table 56.   Historical Data for Small and Medium Length Vessels 
 
b. Medium caliber – Utilizing the manned systems scheme and modifying 














34 ft PB 34.00 12.00 9 36 740 4 2.83 2.25 8.50
Riverine 
Command 
Boat 49.00 12.40 23 40 850 3 3.95 7.60 16.33
Riverine PBF 39.37 19.03 10 38 440 3 2.07 3.33 13.12
Riverine 
Assualt Boat 33.14 8.86 9 40 440 5 3.74 1.80 6.63
27 ft PB 26.90 8.01 3 34 260 4 3.36 0.75 6.73
28 ft PB 27.89 9.84 6 38 500 4 2.83 1.50 6.97
Point Class 25.30 5.20 66 23 1600 2 4.87 33.00 12.65
Light Patrol 
Boat 22.31 8.53 1 35 300 4 2.62 0.25 5.58
Harbour 
Security 
Craft 24.00 8.00 4 22 330 1 3.00 3.90 24.00
NSW 11M 
RIB 36.09 10.50 9 35 940 2 3.44 4.50 18.05
MK V 81.04 17.39 55 45 4506 10 4.66 5.50 8.10
Riverine 
Assualt 
LCPF 35.10 9.20 8 43 600 1 3.82 7.50 35.10
River Patrol 
Boat 35.00 9.30 7 38 600 8 3.76 0.93 4.38
Averages 36.09 10.64 3.46 5.60 12.78
Historical Small and Medium Length Boat systems
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caliber weapon was placed on all medium class ships and above; a 
real-world analogy of this principle is placing a MK38 Mod 2 machine 
gun on a MK5 Boat, and placing one MK38s on a Patrol Craft.  Table 
57 contains the specifications of the representative systems. 
c. Missiles – A directional launch missile system was placed on large 
sized vessels to accommodate the lack of space and weight for 
Vertical Launch Tubes.  These missile systems still provide a good 
range and high single shot probability of kill (Pssk).  The weights of the 
systems include launcher, fire control (guidance) and, missile 
magazine 

















GAU‐19/A  1900  0.68  0.70  0.75  1300  355 
M2HB  1960  0.76  0.79  0.82  70  38.1 
Medium       
Mk 38 Mod 2  2700  0.80  0.83  0.89  180  1,042 
20 mm CIWS  2000  0.99  0.99  0.99  400–1500  494.5 
30 mm CIWS  2000  0.99  0.99  0.99  600–1200  322 
 














20000 0.7 5 8200
RIM‐116 
RAM  10400 0.6 1 7310
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2. Performance 
The derivation of dimension algorithms to convert simple inputs of 
speed, hull parameters, and total displacement was required to obtain 
performance characteristics.   
a. Dimensions  
Total displacement was converted to derive, length, beam, draft, 
and mast height using a ship synthesis approach.  Table 59 is an illustration of 
the work completed.   
Table 59.   Dimensions of TRUCC, with Displacement as Input 
 
Length to Beam (L/B), Beam to Mast Height (B/H) ratios change in 
their relationships based on the total displacement of the vessel.  150 Long Tons 
(LT) and 70 LT were used because research revealed inflection points in 
behavior for all factors at these thresholds.  The next equation converts the 
weight to length. The ratios then allow for deriving the remaining equations.  The 
ratios in Table 59 were derived using a series of if-then statements and 
regression equations.   
Derived equations; Displ – Abbreviation for Displacement 
 L/B = IF(Displ<150,IF(Displ>70,(0.015407*Displ+3),3),5.25) 
 B/H = IF(Displ<150,IF(Displ>70,(0.015407*Displ+2),2),3.125) 
 p is constant; 1.025 tons/m^3 
 Cb (block coefficient) = IF(Displ<150, 0.223, 0.29) 
 Length=((DISPL*(L/B^2)*B/H)/(Cb*P))^(1/3) 
+(0.2*((DISPL*(L/B^2)*B/H)/(Cb*P))^(1/3)) 
Adjusted Displ. 237 tons Length 49.1 m 161.2 ft
L/B 5.250 Beam 9.4 m 30.7 ft
B/H 3.125 Draft 3.0 m 9.8 ft
p 1.025 tons/m^3 Height 18.7 m 61.4 ft
Cb 0.290
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Algorithms were then tested against actual systems/ships.  Figure 
100 is a chart of the comparison. 
 
Figure 100.   Actual Versus Estimated Length of TRUCC 
These dimensions helped to place the design in perspective and allowed the 
group to pursue the remainder of the performance characteristics.                       
b. Horsepower  
Estimated Horsepower (FT-LBS/Min) was derived via a regression.  
 Required HP = IF(Length<120, HP Regression Equation, (2*Speed-
Power*21.5)) 
HP Regression Equation = 242.2+20.2(Length)+3.8(Weight)- 
10.8(speed).  A multivariate regression was used and the group conducted a 
multi-collinearity check.  The group found multi-collinearity did not exist because r 
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 Fuel Weight (LT) = IF(Length<90, 0.075*(((Fuel 
Capacity)*7.01)/2240), ((Fuel Capacity)*7.01)/2240) 
 
 
Figure 102.   Fuel Capacity versus Draft Analysis 
d. Endurance  
Endurance was assumed to represent TRUCC operations in 
continuous use at max speed.  Specific fuel consumption remain constant 
regardless of speed.  Because this is the most restrictive, this errs on the side of 
caution for on-station time. In this model, the speed of this vessel does not 
change the SFC.  The speed instead effects the endurance with a general 
estimation of cruise speed efficiency of assumed to be 70% of maximum speed.  
Required HP changes with speed of the vessel. In the accordance with the 
endurance relationship: 
 Endurance = (1/(SFC*(Required HP/4)/Fuel Weight/2240)/.7)95 
                                            






















Fuel Capacity versus Draft 
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3. Sensors 
The next area of focus was sensor performance. The weight of the sensor 
is not significant because today’s conventional sensors can achieve the detection 
ranges required in the littoral DRMs.  Initially, an attempt was made to place 
representative radar systems onboard the TRUCC keeping in mind weight 
requirements.  The goal was to allocate a percentage of total displacement to 
sensor placement; however, this led to the detail level of Naval Architecture.  
Since most radars take up a fraction of the total displacement while still being 
able to see over the horizon, the model derived sensor performance from the 
simple radar range equation.  It will be up to detail design to specify a sensor 
system that provides the range and sensor performance onboard a specific sized 
vehicle.  For example, a Furuno surface search radar system weighs 
approximately 250 Kg, yet a SPY-1D system weighs several tons.  Due to weight 
requirements, it is not feasible to place a SPY-1D system on the classes of ships 
in our analysis.  
 Radar Range Equation = d(nm) = 1.23 ∗ ሺඥܪ௔ሺ௙௧ሻ ൅ ඥܪ௧ሺ௙௧ሻሻ	 
Ht is the Height of own-ship mast calculated from Table 59 which discusses 
dimensions.  
Ha is the height of the target based on threat profile of the DRM. This is a value 
the user must input into the model initially.  The probability of detection was fixed 
at 0.9 which is realistic and achievable with modern sensors against the given 
threat system 




Payload Range of Detection 23297 yds
Payload Probability of Detection 0.9
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